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Presentation
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Small arms traffic is a costly and longstanding problem 
in Colombia. It is therefore paradoxical that despite its im-
portance and longevity, very few studies have addressed the 
subject.1 This report sheds light on the traffic of illegal arms 
and diversion of legal arms towards illegality. To this end, 
existing information was combined with innovative quantita-
tive analysis, using data from 9,883 of the 18,051 weapons 
surrendered by the AUC between 2003 and 2006, as well 
as from 101 weapons seized by Colombian authorities from 
other illegal armed groups. 
This report was conceived with a dual purpose. First, in 
light of information already available and the cooperation 
of Colombian authorities, the report aims to provide some 
novel insight on this insufficiently studied phenomenon. 
Second, it puts forth some recommendations to improve 
government strategies in dealing with this problem, both for 
Colombian authorities and for the governments of the Eu-
ropean Union and other countries. The study also hopes to 
make a contribution to the international academic debate 
on arms trafficking, inasmuch as it incorporates a volume 
of quantitative analysis that other countries would have dif-
ficulty replicating. 
The project was conducted by the Security and Defense 
Studies team from Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), with 
guidance from An Vranckx, Researcher with the Conflict 
Research Group at the University of Ghent and Associate 
Researcher with the United Nations University Center for 
Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS). Work 
for the project took place between June 2008 and Septem-
ber 2009, and was made possible thanks to funding from 
the Belgian Government. 
The effort would not have borne fruit without the gen-
erous collaboration of several Colombian Government en-
tities, including the National Defense Ministry, the Foreign 
Relations Ministry, the Administrative Department of Secu-
rity (DAS) and the National Police. It also received the kind 
assistance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and the Organization of American States Mission 
to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (OAS/MAPP).
Project researchers thank Colombian Government of-
ficials, representatives of international organizations, and 
other sources who prefer not to be identified, for their assis-
tance and time, without whose support this initiative would 
not have been possible. As always, any errors of fact or in-
terpretation are the sole responsibility of the researchers 
and do not represent the official position or policies of the 
above-mentioned organizations or governments.
ENDNOTES
1 The extent of publications on arms trafficking in Colombia consists of 
two studies by the RAND Corporation and the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime in 2003 and 2006, respectively, and a series of brief 
standalone reports by independent researchers, of which the texts by 
Restrepo and Aguirre for the Small Arms Survey, are outstanding.
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Chapter 1
LIGHT WEAPONS IN COLOMBIA
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Small arms play a major role in violent deaths in Co-
lombia. Historically, nearly four out of every five homicides 
committed in the country involve firearms, and this trend 
has persisted despite the notable drop in the homicide rate 
in recent years. Whereas in 2002 there were 28,534 homi-
cides, in 2008 this figure fell to 15,251--the lowest number 
seen in 30 years. Nonetheless, the proportion of homicides 
perpetrated with firearms only fell from 84.1% to 70.9% 
over the same period.
Table 1,1: Total homicides and homicides involving firearms, 
2002-2008
This section of the report serves this purpose, as it con-
siders Colombia’s legal provisions on the matter, reviews 
the channels through which small arms enter the country, 
discusses the estimated stocks of legal weapons, and goes 
over the limited information available on illegal weapons in 
the country.
The State Monopoly on the Import, 
Possession and Trade of Small Arms
Under Colombian law, the State has a monopoly on is-
suing permits and trading in firearms. This monopoly, estab-
lished under article 223 of the Constitution, grants exclusive 
rights to the State to import, manufacture, and possess 
firearms. As such, the State makes conditional concessions 
for the possession and carrying of arms by individuals who 
meet certain requirements, as put forth in Decree 2535 of 
1993.2
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, Colombia’s 
Military Industry – Indumil, serves as the State’s sole au-
thorized agency for the manufacture and trade in military 
supplies, and is the entity responsible for importing and pro-
ducing firearms in Colombia. This takes place in two ways: 
the import and manufacture of weapons for exclusive use 
by the security forces, and the import, production, and sale 
of weapons for civilian use, including weapons for self-de-
fense, sporting arms, and collectibles.
To supply its security forces, Colombia produces and pur-
chases military weapons, including assault rifles, automatic 
and semiautomatic guns, pistols, revolvers, mortars, mis-
siles, and other weapons for military use. Besides importing 
the supplies required by the Military Forces and National 
Police, throughout its history Indumil has also produced 
different types of weapons and ammunition, under license 
from foreign companies.
This mode of production, relatively common among Latin 
American countries, has served both to reduce procurement 
costs and to boost local industrial capacity, so as to reduce 
dependencies on foreign suppliers and maintain some strate-
gic autonomy.3 In Colombia, the search for self-sufficiency in 
light weapons production began in earnest in the late 90´s, 
and was driven by the virtual embargo imposed by a number 
of its traditional suppliers, who voiced their concerns over the 
human rights situation in the country.
Such was the case of the German company Heckler & 
Koch. During the 1960s and early 1970s, H&K had sold 
55,000 G3 rifles, 3,121 MP5 submachine guns, and 1,500 
HK21 machine guns to Colombia. In 1975, H&K issued Co-
lombia a license to assemble and repair these weapons lo-
YEAR
TOTAL 
HOMICIDES
HOMICIDES BY 
FIREARM
PERCENTAGE
2002 28.534 24.003 84.1%
2003 22.199 18.433 83.0%
2004 18.888 14.545 77.0%
2005 17.331 12.040 69.5%
2006 16.274 11.655 71.6%
2007 16.269 11.604 71.3%
2008 15.251 10.820 70.9%
(Figures from the National Forensic Sciences Institute)
The high rate of firearm use in violent deaths can easily 
be seen in terms of homicides, and just as clearly in deaths 
associated with the armed conflict. As such, they have been 
the common denominator in massacres perpetrated by all 
illegal armed groups, where some 80% of the victims have 
been murdered with firearms. This contrasts with the rela-
tively low use of small arms in cases of assault, suicide, and 
petty crime.1
In light of these facts, Colombia’s interest in the role of 
small arms in daily violence and the armed conflict has been 
growing. In recent years, different government and civil soci-
ety organizations have launched initiatives aimed at control-
ling the possession and use of these weapons, through a 
series of activities that have ranged from voluntary disarma-
ment campaigns to tighter restrictions on carrying weapons, 
spot-check operations, and confiscation. 
Despite these important initiatives, sound public policy 
and effective social controls must be based on a good un-
derstanding of the problem at hand, and in this sense it 
must be acknowledged that the national debate on small 
arms has been biased and fraught with misunderstandings 
and fragmented information. For this reason, a comprehen-
sive look at the issue of small arms and light weapons in 
Colombia must begin with an accurate description of the 
situation. 
8 | www.ideaspaz.org/publicaciones •
cally, thereby extending the G3’s lifespan at a comparatively 
a low cost.4 However, amid increasing European allegations 
regarding Human Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law violations in Colombia, the future reliability of European 
arms suppliers was put in question.
Colombia’s military industry adapted to these adverse 
circumstances, developing mechanisms to supply the 
troops with weapons from other origins. As a result of this, 
Colombia turned to the Israeli Galil as its standard-issue 
assault rifle, initially importing it and later moving towards 
its licensed production. Currently Indumil produces about 
30,000 Galil rifles per year, as well as 40mm MK-1 multiple 
grenade launchers. Improvements to the manufacturing 
process and the gradual expansion of production capacity 
have enabled Indumil to meet the needs of Colombia’s se-
curity forces and even to export Galil rifles to Israel.5
In terms of weapons for civilian use, Indumil imports and 
markets submachine guns, pistols, shotguns, and rifles. In-
dumil also locally manufactures different models of Llama 
revolvers under license from the Spanish parent company. 
These weapons are sold to individuals and corporations on 
the Colombian market, provided that they meet  established 
legal requirements for permits for possession and carrying 
permits.
TYPE OF WEAPON
COUNTRY 
OF ORIGIN
MODEL
Sub-machine guns
Israel Mini Uzi
Czech 
Republic
CZ Skorpion model
Pistols
Germany Walther
Czech 
Republic
CZ Browning  75d 
Compact model
CZ Browning 83 model 
CZ 75 automatic
Israel
Jericho PSL
Jericho PL
Jericho PBL
Carabine Germany Walther
Revolvers Spain
Llama Martial Model
Llama Cassidy 4” Model
Llama Cassidy 3" Model
Llama Scorpio Model
Shotguns
United 
States
Mossberg
Turkey
Hatsan Arms Pistol Grip
Hatsan Arms Folding 
Stocks
Italy Fabara
Table 1.2 Weapons and countries of origin for civilian products 
imported by Indumil
((Information from the Indumil website and Jane’s Infantry 
Weapons 2009-2010)
Indumil has a sophisticated system for registering, 
marking, and tracing both imported weapons and those pro-
duced locally. Products for the exclusive use of the security 
forces and weapons sold to civilians must both undergo a 
process that includes being engraved with the letters “IM,” 
the year of manufacture, and a unique serial number on dif-
ferent parts of the weapon, so that it is possible to identify 
them even in cases of  cannibalization.6
In addition to it engraving processes, in recent years 
laser markings have been added, the details of which are 
classified to ensure their effectiveness for tracing opera-
tions. These measures, unparalleled among Latin American 
arms manufacturers, are the result the industry’s continu-
ous adaptation to counter the illegal armed groups’ repeat-
ed attempts to obtain weapons and ammunition. These 
systems also allow for speedy and effective tracing of legal 
arms when necessary.7
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In addition to Indumil’s own control mechanisms, the 
Arms Trade Control Department - DCCA, a division of the 
Military Forces General Command, is in charge of studying 
and issuing permits to own and carry weapons for civilian 
use, and it has its own information system. Known as the 
Unified Automated National Weapons Archive, the system 
records the type, brand, caliber, and serial number of each 
weapon, and the identity of the person authorized to own it 
or carry it, as the case may be.8
Based on these information systems, legal arms in Co-
lombia numbered just under 1.3 million in 2006, this being 
the number of weapons legally imported, manufactured, and 
registered with the corresponding authority: the Directorate of 
Armaments for each of the forces in the case of the State se-
curity forces, or the Arms Trade Control Department in the case 
of civilians and other government agencies. Of these, 634,000 
were in the hands of State forces and the remaining 662,000 
were in private hands, both private individuals and corpora-
tions. The distribution of these weapons among the different 
categories of users is illustrated in more detail below:9
Table 1.3: Distribution of small arms and light weapons in 
Colombia
Two aspects stand out in this distribution of legal weap-
ons. First, the fact that although Colombian law conceives 
of possession of firearms by individuals as a temporary dis-
pensation made by the State, the number of legal weapons 
in private hands exceeds the total arms owned by the State. 
Second, the fact that fewer than 340,000 of the weapons 
registered in the Unified National Archive had up-to-date 
permits in 2006. Thus, of the 580,000 weapons in the 
hands of individuals, only 40% had permits in effect, and 
of the nearly 83,000 weapons in the hands of corporations, 
the proportion with up-to-date permits was 66%.10
This large number of privately-owned weapons with ex-
pired permits is continuously at risk of slipping into illegality. 
Thus, given that an expired permit is grounds for permanent 
confiscation. This provides no incentive for their owners to 
come forward and legalize their situation, particularly in 
light of stiff penalties for weapons with expired permits. 
These circumstances create conditions in which it is likely 
that original owners whose permits have expired would al-
low their weapons to go into the black market.11
Illegal Arms: Information Gaps and 
Associated Risks
The transfer of legal weapons to the black market high-
lights the necessity of looking into the issue of illegal weap-
ons in Colombia, possibly the most complex aspect of this 
problem. Despite their importance, however, the trade and 
use of illegal weapons is a matter riddled with more ques-
tions than answers. 
A first unknown has to do with the size of the illegal 
weapons market in the country. Some studies point to the 
existence of three to four illegal arms for every legal one in 
circulation.12 These estimates, which some experts feel are 
inflated, cannot be corroborated or disproved empirically, 
given that there is no national registry of illegal weapons, 
thereby making it impossible to monitor the phenomenon 
regularly. 
It is worth mentioning that Colombian authorities ac-
knowledge the need for a system to collect, update, and 
analyze information on illegal weapons, to supplement the 
Unified National Archive. Beyond this acknowledgement, 
however, putting such a system in place is likely to take 
years, because of disagreements among the authorities 
regarding its design and management, as well as because 
of the financial and technical difficulties that developing a 
system of this kind would entail.13
A second question has to do with the impact that illegal 
arms have on society. Even if there are no official figures on 
State
Security 
forces
Army 299.980
Naval 41.186
Air force 9.523
Police 258.500
Total Security Force 609.189
Other 
agencies
DAS 11.894
INPEC 9.380
Prosecutor 
General’s Office
3.055
DIAN 561
Attorney 
General’s Office
182
Total Other Agencies 25.072
Private 
ownership
Individuals
Private individuals 567.959
Collectors 7.865
Sportsmen 4.559
Total individuals 580.383
Companies
Private Security 
Services
82.283
Total Companies 82.283
Total State 634.261
Total Individual 662.666
Overall Total 1.296.927
(Figures from the Arms Trade Control Department reported by the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006)
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their number, public officials and independent analysts both 
agree that most of the guns used in homicides and acts of 
violence in Colombia are illegal.14 To explain this observa-
tion, some studies point to a sort of “unintended effect” of 
the mechanisms that regulate the legal arms market, the 
strengthening of which has increasingly forced illegal armed 
groups and criminals to rely on the illegal market for their 
supplies.15
A third unknown has to do with the origin of illegal weap-
ons. Since Indumil manufactures weapons, and the permits 
have expired for a large proportion of private owners, it is 
expected that some of the illegal weapons are of local ori-
gin. This proportion would grow, albeit marginally, if we were 
to take into account homemade and handcrafted weapons, 
a topic that warrants a more in-depth look in itself.16 At the 
same time, the only published estimate concerning the 
percentage of foreign-made arms in the black market indi-
cates that 75% of the illegal arms in Colombia come from 
abroad.17 For some specific styles of weapons, such as as-
sault rifles, the percentage appears to be much higher.18
A final serious concern is related to the possession of il-
legal weapons. As was mentioned above, it is assumed that 
some of these are in the hands of ordinary citizens, who ac-
quired them legally and do not use them for illicit purposes, 
but whose permits to own and carry weapons have expired. 
Another facet of the problem has to do with illegally-acquired 
weapons belonging to ordinary citizens and petty criminals, 
who may not use them safe for extreme circumstances, but 
whose business boosts demand on the black market. The 
last segment, and perhaps the most troubling one, has to 
do with weapons in the hands of illegal armed groups and 
organized crime syndicates, whose nature implies the ex-
tensive use of armed violence, making them the main cli-
ents for illegal arms in the black market. 
The information available to corroborate these concerns 
is patchy and anecdotal. Some press reports put together 
official estimates and research on the best-known cases of 
trafficking, but this does not allow an in-depth examination 
of the situation.19 Additionally, some officials and institutions 
directly involved in combating arms trafficking occasionally 
publish papers on the subject, but this is still a nascent ef-
fort.20
The unreliability of official information and in-depth stud-
ies on illegal weapons in Colombia is not due, however, to 
a lack of raw material. From 2000 to 2007, Colombian au-
thorities seized 449,962 weapons, and statistical records 
of seizures exist since 1970.21 These weapons, seized in 
different parts of the country in military, law enforcement, 
and intelligence operations, as well as those voluntarily sur-
rendered by demobilized fighters –both individually and col-
lectively-, are a valuable research resource which has not 
been tapped to date. 
Without a doubt, there are barriers that have prevented 
the use of this information. Its  dispersion among different 
agencies, the lack of an automated system, the variety of 
the weapons found in warehouses, and the legal consid-
erations stemming from chain-of-custody procedures, are 
but a few of the difficulties faced by researchers. However, 
none of these factors constitutes an insurmountable ob-
stacle, and careful analysis of that information seems very 
promising.
Project Objectives and Approach
In light of the opportunities for analysis that this large 
sample of illegal weapons represents, the project’s research 
team focused its work on the collection, systematization, 
and analysis of weapons confiscated by different govern-
ment agencies. Clearly, under the scope of the project it 
would not be possible to cover all the illegal weapons in the 
custody of the State, a universe of data on which precise in-
formation does not exist, and that could cover several hun-
dreds of thousands of records.22 As such, work was done 
along four lines, as explained below.
First, we reviewed all the literature, official documents, 
and press reports about illegal arms trafficking in Colombia 
during the past decade. Second, work meetings were held 
to share information with experts, officials and representa-
tives of Colombian intelligence agencies. Third, visits were 
made to physically inspect and record survey data on 101 
weapons held in the warehouses of the Arms Trade Con-
trol Department, the National Police Criminal Investigation 
Directorate, and the Metropolitan Police Criminal Investiga-
tion Division in Bogotá. Finally, a sample of 9,851 of the 
18,051 weapons surrendered by the Colombian United Self-
Defense Groups (AUC) between 2003 and 2006, was used 
to develop a database for quantitative analysis. 
On this basis, a broad body of information was compiled, 
and efforts were made to record some of the knowledge 
and expertise of public officials who, despite their ample ex-
perience in the fight against illegal weapons, have not had 
the opportunity to document their experiences for the ben-
efit of future specialists. The information gathered over the 
course of the project allows some preliminary answers to 
the aforementioned questions, and serves to propose new 
veins of inquiry. What similarities exist in terms of the types 
and origins of the legal and illegal weapons that are circu-
lating in the country? What can be inferred about the trans-
fer of weapons from State security forces to illegal armed 
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groups? What patterns may be revealed on the dynamics of 
weapons procurement by the AUC?
The following pages seek to address these questions 
based on the aforementioned information. At any rate, a 
series of preliminary results serve to confirm researchers’ 
suspicions and to give impetus to the study. First, weapons 
surrendered by the AUC underlined this illegal group’s no-
torious firepower: over 70% of the surrendered arms were 
rifles and machine guns. Second, surveyed weapons came 
predominantly from international sources: more than 97% 
of these came from different parts of North America, Asia, 
the Middle East, and Europe. 
Finally, in terms of the places of origin, the percentage 
of weapons coming from Europe was striking in the sample: 
4,883 weapons. This is paradoxical when one considers 
that Colombia has not produced European weapons under 
license and that several EU countries, in response to the 
Code of Conduct on the export of these products, have re-
frained from selling arms to Colombia precisely because of 
the fear that these might fall into the hands of illegal groups 
and be used for human rights violations. The fact that an 
illegal armed group labeled a terrorist organization by Co-
lombia and the European Union managed to obtain 27% 
of its arms from countries that have imposed a “de facto 
embargo” on the Colombian State, is an interesting finding, 
worthy of more detailed study.
6 Cannibalization refers to the process by which the different components 
of a weapon are used to repair or build another weapon. In Colombian 
this phenomenon has been observed in many of the weapons seized 
from members of illegal armed groups and even from common crimi-
nals.
7 According to official figures, 98% of the tracing requests sent to Indumil 
are resolved satisfactorily (See: Aguirre, Catherine y Restrepo. Jorge. 
“Marcaje y rastreo de munición: Indumil en Colombia”. En la Mira, 
2006. p. 3.), and the system makes it possible for the manufacturer to 
identify any of its products within six hours, once the request has been 
received (See: UNODC, 2006, op. cit, p.75).
8 Bello Montes, Catalina, “El control de las armas ligeras: retos y desafíos 
para el nuevo milenio,” Revista Criminalidad, Bogotá, Imprenta Nacio-
nal, 2005, Vol.III, p. 10.
9 A certain amount of controversy exists over the reliability of the figures 
cited in the report “Violencia, Crimen y Tráfico Ilegal de Armas en Co-
lombia,” published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 
2006. Without downplaying the critiques of its shortcomings, the report 
remains the most important source of public information on small arms 
in the country, and as such the research team used it extensively. Also, 
it should be noted that given the impossibility of obtaining up-to-date 
figures on the number of guns registered in the country with primary in-
formation from the Arms Trade Control Department, the authors decided 
to refer to the UNODC figures on the total number of weapons held by 
each public and private agency.
10 UNODC, 2006, op. cit, p.48.
11 Ibid, p.47.
12 Cragin, Kim and Hoffman, Bruce. Arms Trafficking and Colombia. Santa 
Monica, RAND Corporation, 2003. xvii.
13 The National Coordination Committee To Prevent, Combat and Eradicate 
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (TIA 
Committee), established in 2007, included the creation of an informa-
tion system with these characteristics in its plan of action for 2009. Both 
the design and the securing of funding resources for the project are 
running late in terms of the proposed timetable.
14 The director of the Arms Trade Control Department originally expressed 
this view to the project’s researchers in late 2008, during the initial 
stage of the project, and it was subsequently repeated by different pub-
lic officials and independent researchers who were contacted in the pur-
suit of the work.
15 Aguirre and Restrepo, 2006, op. cit, p.3.
16 During its deliberations in 2009, the TIA Committee proposed the need 
for a thorough study of homemade and handcrafted weapons. At the 
time of writing this report, the state of progress on that study was not 
known.
17 Cragin and Hoffman, 2003, op. cit, xvii.
18 All of the 1,647 rifles that Colombian authorities seized in 2008 were 
foreign-made. See: Center for Antiexplosives Information and Weapons 
Tracing (CIARA), “Armas incautadas en Colombia,” Revista CIARA, Bo-
gotá, 1998, No. 2, p. 31
ENDNOTES
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODC. Violencia, Crimen y 
Tráfico Ilegal de Armas en Colombia, Bogotá, UNODC, p.12-14.
2 Decree 2335 of 1993 is regulated by Decree 1809 of 1994 and comple-
mented by Decree 356 of 1994. These laws set forth the conditions un-
der which individuals and juridical persons may own and carry weapons 
in Colombia.
3 Pachón Pinzón, Rocío. La industria de armas en Colombia: entre la 
búsqueda se autosuficiencia y de sostenibilidad. Fundación Seguridad y 
Democracia. Bogotá, 2009. p.3.
4 The nature of these licenses was confirmed by Indumil staff. Likewise, 
according to Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2009-2010, the only Latin Ameri-
can country that was licensed to manufacture Heckler & Koch weapons 
was Mexico.
5 The number of Galil rifles manufactured varies from year to year, accord-
ing to the needs of the defense sector. In 2004 production reached a 
peak of 38,500 rifles, whereas in 2008 the number was 30,571 units. 
It is worth mentioning that Indumil is currently the only international 
producer of Galil rifles, and the company has become the supplier to 
the Israeli Defense Forces. See: Industria Militar, Informe de Gestión, 
Bogotá, Imprenta Nacional, 2008, p. 20.
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19 See, for example, Gloria Helena Rey, “Tráfico de armas: combustible 
para el incendio,” El Tiempo, Lecturas Dominicales, 16 May 2004.
20 The National Police is the State agency with the most experience is this 
sort of dissemination mechanism, both in its annual yearbook “Crimi-
nalidad,” as well as through the new periodical by the Center for Anti-
explosives Information and Weapons Tracing (CIARA), whose third issue 
should be published in December 2009.
21 Revista CIARA, Bogotá, No. 2, p. 31
22 Based on information discussed with officials at different agencies, it 
is estimated that this figure could be between 250,000 and 350,000 
weapons, but the lack of a unified national registry makes it impossible 
to corroborate or disprove this estimate.
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Chapter 2
ARMS TRAFFICKING AND THE ILLEGAL 
ARMED GROUPS IN COLOMBIA
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Since the late 20th century, Colombia’s illegal armed 
groups have played an active role in two illegal markets with 
international scope: drug trafficking and arms trafficking. 
Recognizing the social impact and the symbiosis between 
these two phenomena, Colombian authorities have shown 
interest in fighting them, even when the international coop-
eration resources to combat arms trafficking are incompat-
ible with those designed to fight drug trafficking. To illustrate 
the public policy challenges posed by arms trafficking in Co-
lombia, pages that follow provide a brief summary of the 
background, trends and prospects for this problem. 
Arms Trafficking in an Ongoing Conflict 
During the past two decades, the dynamics of arms traf-
ficking in Colombia have been affected by a combination 
of three factors. First, the persistence of Colombia’s armed 
conflict has made the country one of the few constant desti-
nations for illegal weapons in Latin America since the end of 
the Cold War. Second, the growing wealth and power of the 
illegal armed groups have spurred a notable increase in the 
weapons black market in the late 20th century. Third, with 
the security concerns that have buffeted Colombia since 
the early 1990s, the legal arms market grew considerably, 
creating opportunities for siphoning and channeling legal 
weapons to illegal ends. 
Arms Trafficking in the Post-Cold War Period
During the Cold War, the proliferation of illegal armed 
groups of different ideologies created significant demand 
for light weapons in Latin America. Thus, the rise of the 
guerrilla and paramilitary groups from the Southern Cone to 
Mexico during the second half of the 20th century was ac-
companied by large flows of automatic weapons into Latin 
American countries, especially assault rifles. These arms 
transfers varied significantly in terms of their countries of 
origin, time periods, types of weapons, and the actors in-
volved, and as such, it is hard to make broad generaliza-
tions. Amid this diversity, the wars in Central America during 
the 1970s and 1980s occupy a special place.1 
In this sense, Soviet-backing for the Sandinista re-
gime and U.S. cooperation with the governments of Gua-
temala and El Salvador, and its support for the Contras 
in Nicaragua, contributed to a remarkable concentration 
of light weapons in the Central American republics in the 
late 1980s.2 Following a series of peace accords that led 
to the demobilization of the different guerrilla groups and 
forced drastic reductions to State security forces in the early 
1990s, the procedures for controlling the stockpiles were 
inadequate, and some of these weapons were appropriated 
by illegal agents who were able to put them up for sale on 
the black market.3 
Beyond Central America, involvement in arms traffick-
ing was mixed in other regions of Latin America at the end 
of last century. Thus, one group of countries that was little 
affected by this phenomenon was Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
and Uruguay. Here, given the virtual absence of guerrillas 
and organized crime syndicates of any size, these countries 
lacked the relevant internal markets for arms trafficking, 
even though on some occasions their governments were in-
volved in illegal arms sales to other countries in the region.4 
A second group consists of countries that, although they did 
not face guerrilla groups in the 1990s, had to deal with or-
ganized crime, and as such, a black market existed for light 
weapons in Brazil, Mexico, and Paraguay.
The final group is where most of the arms trafficking ac-
tivity took place, and these countries include Colombia, Ec-
uador, Peru, and Venezuela, to differing degrees. Colombia 
and Peru had the most demand, in that armed groups and 
powerful criminal organizations existed in both countries.5 
The other two, Ecuador and Venezuela, despite not hav-
ing large internal markets for arms, were strategically lo-
cated to supply the demands of the neighboring countries 
black markets. On the one hand, they share extensive jun-
gle borders that are porous and difficult for the destination 
countries to control.6 On the other, their military forces are 
small but relatively well-equipped, thus providing opportuni-
ties for siphoning from the State-owned stockpiles, usually 
in collusion with corrupt officials.7 
This scenario underwent some changes in the early 
1990s, as the internal security situation in Peru stabilized 
while the Colombian situation became more complex. Par-
allel to the demobilization of the Peruvian guerrillas, Co-
lombia experienced rapid growth among its illegal armed 
groups. On the one hand, after declining to participate in 
the peace negotiations that the government held with other 
guerrilla groups in the early 1990s, both the FARC and the 
ELN launched ambitious fortification plans. On the other 
hand, under the umbrella of the AUC, a number of para-
military groups that had been disparate, united and were 
strengthened. 
These circumstances, combined with the inability of the 
State security forces to exert decisive control over the entire 
national territory, gave way to a full scale confrontation be-
tween illegal groups that pushed the demand for weapons 
to unprecedented levels. In this sense, at the end of the 
20th century, Colombia ranked as the only country in Latin 
America with a significant and growing demand for light 
weapons. 
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Growing Demand on the Black Market
Different people are implicated in the weapons black 
market in Colombia, from ordinary citizens who purchased 
guns legally but whose permits have lapsed, to powerful il-
legal armed groups and organized crime syndicates. In this 
sense, the black market for light weapons in Colombia is not 
the exclusive domain of the guerrillas and the drug cartels, 
although these play a determining role in shaping the black 
market, basically for two reasons. 
First, whereas ordinary citizens and common criminals 
who buy weapons on the black market generally prefer 
small arms, the illegal armed groups tend to go for assault 
rifles and, in general, automatic weapons that give them 
greater firepower.8 Second, ordinary citizens and common 
criminals usually purchase small quantities, rarely exceed-
ing one weapon per transaction, whereas the illegal armed 
groups make significantly larger transactions that can range 
from a dozen to several thousand weapons in one deal.9 
For this reason, a look at the history of arms traffick-
ing in Colombia must include a review of the patterns of 
strengthening that the different illegal armed groups em-
ployed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. 
The FARC used a strategy of splitting its fronts that en-
abled the guerrilla organization to multiply its geographical 
presence, transforming the eight fronts it had in 1980 to al-
most 45 fronts by 1990, and increasing its manpower from 
2,000 men to nearly 10,000 men.10 Of these new structures, 
six were in the vicinity of the border with Venezuela and four 
were in the border area with Ecuador, which enabled the 
FARC to use a number of overland and river routes for its 
trafficking operations.11 
In the case of the ELN, this group managed to multiply 
the mere three fronts it had in 1980 with close to 250 men, 
into 21 fronts with about 2,000 men in 1990, of which six of 
these were located near the border with Venezuela and one 
was in the vicinity of the border with Ecuador.12 
The opening of the land and river routes facilitated traf-
ficking operations by sea, to the extent that both organiza-
tions set up armed units on Colombia’s coast. In the case of 
the FARC, three new fronts were deployed in departments 
on the coast, two on the Caribbean and one on the Pacific 
coast.13 The ELN went even further, with three fronts on the 
Caribbean and the same number on the Pacific coast.14
This growth trend in terms of the guerrillas’ manpower 
and geographical presence, continued during the 1990s, 
albeit at a somewhat lower rate. Thus, the FARC added ap-
proximately 20 rural fronts to their organization between 
1990 and 1998, totaling close to 16,000 men, while the 
ELN added a dozen fronts, reaching around 3,000 combat-
ants.15 In terms of territorial coverage, the FARC located five 
of the new fronts in border regions: one at the Venezuelan 
border, two on the Caribbean, one on the Pacific, and one at 
the border with Ecuador. The ELN located an equal number 
of fronts in the border areas, although its distribution fo-
cused more clearly on Venezuela and the Pacific coast.16 
In any case, although the guerrillas’ growth rate was 
not the same in the 1990s as it was during the previous 
decade, their aggressiveness and commitment to take the 
offensive increased markedly. In this regard, between 1990 
and the end of the decade, attacks on towns and the securi-
ty forces increased dramatically, from approximately 2,500 
cases to just over 3,600.17 Similarly, while lower profile op-
erations like ambushes declined during the second half of 
the 1980s and the following decade, higher profile opera-
tions such as combat between the Military Forces and the 
guerrillas grew markedly, revealing the illegal groups’ great 
skill and willingness to engage with the State troops.18 
The guerrillas’ growth and resolve to take the offensive 
ratcheted up the demand for illegal weapons, which repre-
sented a major milestone in the history of arms trafficking in 
Colombia. The most notorious example of this situation was 
the FARC’s purchase of 10,000 Jordanian AKM-MPiKM rifles, 
in a deal involving Peruvian security adviser Vladimiro Mon-
tesinos, Lebanese arms dealer Sarkis Soghanalian, and the 
Russian military attaché in Lima.19 Major arms trafficking ac-
quisitions were routinely supplemented with deals for smaller 
quantities of weapons by stealing these from State forces, 
purchasing them from corrupt officials from neighboring 
countries, and even accepting ransom payments in kind.20 
While the guerrillas were bolstering their power, differ-
ent self-defense groups were springing up around the coun-
try, laying the foundations for the organization that later 
became known as the AUC. Unlike the guerrillas, who expe-
rienced their phase of greatest growth in the late 1980s, the 
AUC grew during the 1990s. Thus, whereas between 1986 
and 1990 the AUC added about 1,700 men to their ranks, 
between 1990 and the end of the century, an additional 
6,300 men joined them.21 
Similar to the guerrillas, this growth made it possible for 
the AUC to take a noticeably more aggressive stance, so that 
whereas in 1995 direct clashes between the self-defense 
groups and the guerrillas were practically non-existent, by 
2000 this figure was around 80 clashes, and by 2001 it 
was approaching 100.22 In this sense, the strengthening 
process that the AUC undertook during the 1990s enabled 
this group to become a relevant armed actor in Colombia’s 
security situation, ready to fight the guerrillas and capable 
of doing so. 
While the guerrillas were becoming major players in the 
international black market for illegal weapons, the AUC also 
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engaged in large scale trafficking. In July 1999 a ship that 
had sailed from the port of Varna docked in Buenaventura 
and unloaded 7,640 AK-47 and M1A1 rifles from the Bul-
garian Arsenal Company. The guns were loaded onto trucks 
without attracting the attention of the authorities, and they 
were later found in the hands of the AUC. This operation was 
supplemented with 3,000 AK-47 rifles from the Nicaraguan 
Police, which the AUC purchased from Ori Zoller and Shimon 
Yelinek, two Israeli citizens with an long history as interme-
diaries in arms deals.23
A Legal Market and Growing Armed Forces 
To the extent that security conditions deteriorated dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s, increasingly the State, private 
citizens, and legally registered security companies acquired 
more weapons. 
In terms of the latter, Colombia went from having 763 
companies in the field of private security in 1994, to close to 
3,510 companies 13 years later. It should be clarified, how-
ever, that not all of these companies have permits to use 
weapons in their operations, only armed security compa-
nies, cash transport companies, armed cooperatives, and 
security departments may receive these permits. In 2007 
these totaled 56.1% of the registered security companies, 
meaning about 1,883 companies.24 In any case, as was 
mentioned previously, homicide with firearms in Colombia 
have traditionally been more linked to the actions of armed 
groups and organized crime, than perpetrated by individu-
als or companies whose weapons were acquired legally.25 
At the same time, the growth of the Military Forces meant 
a significant increase in legal demand for arms. This was par-
ticularly clear in the case of assault rifles and side arms, to 
the extent that the country went from having about 90,000 
armed troops in 1990 to about 280,000 at present, of whom 
232,000 are in the Army.26 Most of this demand was met 
with Galil rifles produced by Indumil, and supplemented with 
some special imports and equipment donated by other coun-
tries through international cooperation agreements.27
The National Police also contributed to the demand for 
assault rifles and side arms, although to a lesser degree 
than the Military Forces. Thus, after the costly learning ex-
perience of the 1990s, when a large number of police sta-
tions and patrols were caught without sufficient firepower 
to defend themselves from attacks by illegal armed groups 
in rural areas, the Police decided to equip their units with 
Galil rifles and imported weapons.28 This decision was made 
while the institution was increasing its manpower rapidly, to 
its current number of 146,000 men.29 
This growth of the State arsenal does not appear to have 
been accompanied by a corresponding increase in illegal 
violence committed with State-owned weapons. This may 
be observed in the decrease in the number of the charges 
brought against the security forces for human rights abuses 
in the past decade. Whereas in 1995 the oversight agen-
cies reported 3,000 cases of abuses perpetrated against 
civilians and attributed to the security forces, by 1998 this 
figure had fallen to 1,680 cases, with only 241 cases re-
ported in 2008.30  
 
Patterns and Trends in Arms Trafficking
From Stealing to Buying
The new century brought a number of changes to the 
way that the illegal armed groups in Colombia acquired their 
weapons. In the late 1990s the guerrillas were getting their 
weapons in three main ways. The first and most traditional 
way was by stealing weapons by ambushing small security 
force patrols, which was an acquisitions strategy with sig-
nificant symbolic repercussions and relatively easy as a 
tactic.31 
The second way, more recent in historical terms but no 
less effective for that reason, has been to buy small quanti-
ties of weapons on the transnational black market, espe-
cially across the land borders with neighboring countries. In 
this approach, although no single deal has much impact on 
the guerrillas’ stocks, the cumulative effect over time adds 
up impressively. This phenomenon explains the frequency 
with which weapons confiscated from Colombian guerrilla 
groups are discovered to have come from Ecuadorian, Peru-
vian, and Venezuelan stocks.32 
The third way is by buying in bulk. This is much more re-
cent, and it is possible that this only came into effect in the 
late 1990s, when financial resources and international drug 
trafficking ties enabled the FARC to position itself as a major 
player in the international black market for arms. Using this 
method, the abovementioned deal was made to purchase 
10,000 rifles, an operation that was unprecedented in the 
country and, apparently, the only deal of this magnitude 
that this guerrilla group carried out.
As is mentioned above, these three ways of acquiring 
weapons are not mutually exclusive, and in recent decades 
the guerrillas have employed these simultaneously. This 
makes it possible to explain why the security forces have 
seized such a wide variety of weapons from the FARC, 
among them Russian AK-47s, Hungarian AKMs, East Ger-
man MpiKMs, and Belgian FAL M63s and M61T1s.33 
In this sense, among the weapons commonly used by 
the guerrillas, the apparently low proportion of weapons 
stolen from State forces is striking. Two main reasons could 
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explain this, at least in terms of recent years. First, the 
strengthening of the State forces seems to have reduced 
the guerrillas’ ability to carry out successful ambushes, and 
second, this reduction in opportunities for acquiring weap-
ons by stealing them from the State forces has meant that 
the weapons already in the hands of the guerrillas are see-
ing more use and possibly becoming worn out. In light of the 
foregoing, it would seem that transnational deals for small 
quantities has become the prevalent method by which the 
guerrillas are procuring their supplies at present.34 
In terms of the former AUC, they appear to have pro-
cured weapons using three basic methods. The first meth-
od, markedly different from what was mentioned above, 
was to acquire small quantities of weapons through corrupt 
contacts in the State security forces. On this subject it is 
worth mentioning that fighters who demobilized as part of 
the Justice and Peace process have given testimony that 
implicates active and retired security officials, but both the 
number of accusations and the quantities of weapons at 
stake suggest that this was not a systematic practice.35 As 
such, the low incidence of Galil rifles in the AUC arsenal is 
notable; there were 167 Galil rifles out of 13,038 rifles that 
were surrendered.36
The other two strategies that the AUC used to acquire 
weapons were similar to those used by the guerrillas. One 
was transnational purchases of small quantities of weap-
ons, making use of the land and maritime borders where 
their units were operating. Also, as was mentioned previ-
ously, the AUC made at least two major purchases of weap-
ons on the international black market. 
As with the guerrillas, these three ways of acquiring 
weapons were not mutually exclusive, and would most likely 
have been used simultaneously. This would explain the find-
ings of very different weapons such as US-made Colt Match 
Target, M-16, AR-15, and Winchester M-14 rifles, Bulgarian 
AK-47 and M1A1s, Russian AK-47s, Hungarian AMD-65s, 
and Russian PKM machine guns in the hands of that illegal 
organization.37
Standardization and Sophistication 
As the mechanisms for supplying the illegal armed 
groups have changed over time, there have also been 
changes in their criteria for acquiring weapons. On the one 
hand, both the guerrillas and the AUC showed a growing 
interest in standardizing their arsenals in the late 1990s. 
On the other hand, the guerrillas, and more specifically the 
FARC, have been trying to acquire more sophisticated mili-
tary equipment since the beginning of this century, in order 
to counteract the increased strengthen of the State security 
forces. 
In terms of standardization, as the number of fighters in 
the ranks of the illegal armed groups was growing, the dif-
ficulties inherent to equipping units with disparate weapons 
became increasingly apparent. Thus, they were motivated 
to make each group’s arsenals more uniform, in an effect to 
facilitate logistical supplies and to increase interoperability 
among different groups. 
In this regard, given the coexistence of different caliber 
weapons in their ranks in the late 1990s, mainly U.S. NATO 
5.56 caliber weapons, and to a lesser degree Soviet-made 
7.62x39 weapons, the AUC made their large purchases 
at the start of the century not only to equip their growing 
numbers of men, but also to standardize their weaponry. As 
such, the acquisition of different models of AK-47s made it 
possible for the AUC to equip a significant number of their 
men with a standard weapon. In any case, it is worth men-
tioning that this standardization process was never finished, 
because the major international acquisitions of the time do 
not appear to have surpassed a total of 11,000 rifles. 
As for the guerrillas, the FARC pursued a similar process, 
although they did so a few years earlier than the AUC. Thus, 
the purchase of 10,000 Jordanian MpiKMs manufactured in 
the former East Germany sought to equip the growing num-
ber of guerrilla fighters, while seeking to make 7.62x39 their 
standard. Like the AUC, however, the process was not com-
pleted because the quantity of weapons that made it into 
the country was not enough to outfit all of the FARC groups. 
Paradoxically, the ELN’s small size appears to have been 
an advantage in this standardization process, because the 
group was able to equip its troops almost exclusively with 
7.62x39 weapons, especially AKM and MpiKM rifles.38 
It should be noted that the armed groups’ preference 
for 7.62x39 caliber weapons is somewhat paradoxical. Al-
though various kinds of surplus Soviet weapons were avail-
able on the black market at the end of century, neither 
Colombia nor its neighbors manufactured the necessary 
caliber ammunition. In this sense, even though availability 
and low price may have been factors that favored the ac-
quisition of 7.62x39 weapons, the difficulties in obtaining 
ammunition were significant.39 Several analysts point to 
possible changes in this scenario as the result of the recent 
opening of a factory to manufacture that caliber of ammuni-
tion in Venezuela. 
With regard to procuring more sophisticated light weap-
ons, the FARC has done considerably better than other 
armed groups, as three recent examples demonstrate. First, 
the seizure of a large quantity of night scopes, designed to 
counter the Military Forces’ capacity for nighttime opera-
tions.40 Second, the purchase and adaptation of sniper rifles 
whose use has become relatively common certain zones.41 
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Third, the acquisition of heavier armaments, like the AT-4 
anti-tank rockets that Sweden originally sold to Venezuela, 
of which several examples have been discovered recently.42 
This combination of equipment demonstrates that the FARC 
not only continues its efforts to improve its military sophis-
tication, but that it has managed to sustain and make use 
of its networks of contacts and suppliers, despite increasing 
pressure by the State.
Drugs and Weapons
Drug trafficking has become an increasingly important 
element in terms of the illegal armed groups’ involvement 
in international arms trafficking. In this sense, to the degree 
that the armed groups became involved in drug trafficking, 
both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries came into contact 
with international organized crime networks with which they 
previously had no ties.43 Thus, by establishing relations with 
international organized crime syndicates and kingpins, their 
ties transcended the Andean milieu, literally opened up a 
new world of opportunities for the illegal armed groups in 
terms of arms trafficking. 
Second, in recent years increasingly the same tactics 
used in drug trafficking have been employed for receiving 
weapons, by air, land, and sea. This takes place in two dif-
ferent ways. One, given that the means of transport, the 
routes, and the cargo are illegal, there is no incentive to lim-
it operations to transporting a single kind of merchandise. 
Two, although the transport services and the routes may be 
legal, weapons or drugs might be hidden in the cargo, and 
the skills developed in camouflaging one kind of  product 
may be used to disguise another.44 
Third, as the illegal armed groups began to consolidate 
their control of the drug business, narcotics went from be-
ing exclusively a means of paying for weapons shipments to 
become a commonly accepted currency. Thus, recent years 
have seen a shift in strategies for arms purchases, in which 
deals involve not only international traffickers who expect 
cash payments, but also international drug trafficking orga-
nizations that accept these illegal substances in exchange 
for supplying weapons to Colombian groups.45 In light of this 
combination of factors, in recent years the distance between 
arms trafficking and the drug trade in Colombia has shrunk, 
until they have transformed into overlapping phenomena. 
Future Prospects
The longevity of the armed conflict and the remarkable 
capacity of the illegal armed groups to adapt and mutate 
makes it highly likely that arms trafficking to Colombia will 
persist in the short and medium term. Because of this, a 
number of concerns exist as to how this phenomenon will 
evolve in the coming years, and the inherent consequences 
both for Colombian society and for the other countries of the 
region. Specifically, two issues deserve particular attention: 
the effectiveness of the mechanisms for the surrender and 
confiscation of weapons, and the emergence of new actors 
on the national and regional scene.
New Actors, New Risks
The emergence of new players on the regional scene 
entails a number of risks in terms of arms trafficking, both 
inside Colombia and from abroad to the country. 
At one level, the rise of criminal gangs at the service of 
drug trafficking, commonly called BACRIM (emerging crimi-
nal gangs), has created a new demand for light weapons. 
On the one hand, these groups have recovered the weapons 
previously used by the AUC, locating their caches and mak-
ing use of the weapons found there. On the other hand, they 
have turned to the international black market, either by tak-
ing advantage of the old contacts and trafficking networks 
that the AUC used, or by establishing new business relations 
with international traffickers. In any case, it appears to be 
clear that during the few years that these emerging gangs 
have been operating, they have carried out international 
arms deals, feeding the demand for illegal weapons in Co-
lombia.46 
At a second level, the international reach of a number of 
foreign criminal organizations dedicated to drug trafficking 
has created new partnerships for Colombia’s armed groups 
in the Latin American context. Thus the Mexican cartels’ 
geographical proximity to the United States and their proven 
ability to obtain large quantities of weapons have made 
them potential suppliers of arms at lower cost and with 
greater reliability than other international agents.47 A similar 
risk is posed by Central American gangs and small cartels, 
whose access to old weapons surpluses in their respective 
countries has been demostrated.48 
At a third level, the increased presence in Latin America 
of non-traditional States that are willing to sell sophisticated 
weapons without much by way of restrictions or controls im-
plies an additional risk of channeling to the black market. 
This mode includes the purchase of 100,000 AK-103 rifles 
for Venezuela’s Armed Forces, an amount that exceeds 
the 40,000 men in that country’s forces, the construction 
of a factory to manufacture 7.62x39 caliber ammunition, 
and the acquisition of an unspecified number of Igla-S anti-
aircraft missiles, whose eventual channeling to Colombian 
armed groups would have dire consequences for the gov-
ernment forces air divisions. 
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From this point of view, the fact that State forces in the 
Andean countries received new weapons, does not mean 
that these were immediately channeled to Colombia’s ille-
gal armed groups, but nonetheless the legacy of trafficking 
in small quantities from neighboring countries to the Colom-
bian border entails a series of potential risks. 
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Chapter 3
THE COLOMBIAN STATE RESPONSE 
TO ARMS TRAFFICKING
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The persistence and lethality of arms trafficking have 
led the Colombian authorities to take numerous actions 
to address this phenomenon. Several of these measures 
have made the country a leader in this field, both in Latin 
America and internationally.1 Nonetheless, Colombia is still 
perceived as a critical juncture for the networks of gunrun-
ners that operate in the Andean region and the Caribbean.2 
In light of this paradoxical situation, this chapter outlines 
both the progress that has been made, as well as the main 
stumbling blocks in the efforts by the Colombian State to 
fight arms trafficking.
International Instruments and National 
Laws
In parity with other countries of the Americas, for over 
a decade Colombia has implemented a pioneering series 
of regional instruments to control proliferation and arms 
trafficking. Part of this includes the 1997 adoption of the 
Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of 
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and 
Other Related Materials (CIFTA).3 This convention made the 
Organization of American States the first regional organiza-
tion in the world to adopt a scheme of this kind, and it has 
been supplemented with various instruments since its in-
ception.4
Colombia’s commitment to this subject is widely recog-
nized at the international level. In 2001, then Deputy For-
eign Minister Camilo Reyes Rodríguez chaired the United 
Nations conference that resulted in the Programme of Ac-
tion To Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Their Aspects. It has 
kept up this leading role over time, in that Colombia spon-
sors, along with other countries, the Resolution on the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects 
which is presented annually to the General Assembly.5
All this has been complemented by fostering subregional 
initiatives, among which the Andean Plan to Prevent, Com-
bat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in all its Aspects, adopted by the Andean Commu-
nity of Nations in 2003, is outstanding. Commonly known as 
Decision 552, the plan embraces the main elements of ex-
isting international instruments and goes further in several 
areas to improve its implementation, including the record-
ing and dissemination of official statistics, promoting stud-
ies on the subject, and involving civil society in the debates 
on public policy. 
The role of the Colombian State in promoting interna-
tional instruments to combat arms trafficking is based on 
the legislation that has been in place in the country since 
the early 1990s. Decree 2535 of 1993, supplemented 
by Decree 1809 of 1994, established strict regulations 
for controlling small arms in the country. In this sense, it 
specified that possession and carrying of weapons are not 
inherent rights of the citizens, as in other countries in the 
hemisphere, but rather a privilege granted by the State, 
which is subject to rules.6 
Since that time, Colombia has been developing its gun 
control legislation in a relatively continuous manner, com-
plementing, clarifying, and updating the internal regulations 
in accordance with the country’s changing security situa-
tion, new technological possibilities, and new consensus 
reached by the international community. Examples of this 
are the regular updating of the Indumil procedures manual 
for identification markings, 7 as well as the inclusion of arms 
trafficking as a crime in the Criminal Code and its comple-
mentary regulations.8
This has resulted in an extensive body of regulations 
that are in accordance with the commitments that the coun-
try has made. Indeed, in some respects, Colombian laws 
and industry standards surpass international standards. 
Thus, the fact that production records have been kept for 
Llama revolvers since 1991, and for Galil rifles since 1996, 
exceeds the 10 years specified in the United Nations Proto-
col.9 In the same way, several of the techniques for marking 
weapons and ammunition manufactured in the country go 
beyond the international requirements and are unequaled 
in the region.10
Although Colombian laws and the signing of interna-
tional instruments are evidence of the efforts made by the 
State to fight arms trafficking, the way that this phenom-
enon evolves necessitates the continuous development of 
policies, in response to new situations. A recent example 
was the passage of Law 1142 of 2007 that increased prison 
sentences for persons involved in these activities, and elimi-
nated the possibility of release from custody or serving the 
sentence under house arrest, responding in this way to the 
recommendation made in the 2006 UNODC study.11
In this process of adapting the laws, some aspects re-
main that merit further customization. The same UNODC 
study, for example, noted the need for greater clarity con-
cerning the policies and procedures that determine the 
purpose and use of weapons that have been seized and 
confiscated.12 So far as the authors have been able to deter-
mine, Colombia has not made decisions in this regard in the 
past two years. It is important, therefore, to give continuity 
to the legislative efforts that have consolidated gun control 
as a State policy in Colombia, both domestically and inter-
nationally.
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Division of Responsibility Among 
Organizations
The abovementioned efforts at regulation have been 
accompanied by the creation of new mechanisms for creat-
ing policies and strengthening the State’s ability to enforce 
regulations, investigate, and fight arms trafficking. In terms 
of the definition of policies, the most recent development is 
the creation of the National Coordination Committee To Pre-
vent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, commonly known as 
the TIA Committee. This collegiate established in December 
2006, regularly meets with government authorities to de-
velop national policy on arms trafficking.13
The committee includes the Ministries of the Interior 
and Justice, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Trade, Industry and 
Tourism, the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), 
the Armed Forces General Command, the National Police, 
the National Customs and Tax Directorate (DIAN), and the 
Military Industry of Colombia (Indumil). Its functions include 
designing and implementing the National Plan To Prevent, 
Combat, and Eradicate Arms Trafficking, whose final version 
was approved in March 2009, after 22 meetings.14
Both the creation of the committee and the approval of 
the national plan constitute significant progress in coordi-
nating State efforts to combat arms trafficking. However, 
the committee does not seem to be keeping pace with the 
number of policy decisions and actions taken to date.15 It 
is notable that almost three years after its creation, the 
committee has not yet been able to implement the national 
plan, because of a shortfall in budgetary resources and the 
persistent difficulties of the consensual decision-making 
process. 
In terms of the latter, it has been noted that the fact that 
the Arms Trade Control Department chairs the committee’s 
Technical Secretariat might be responsible for some of the 
difficulties that have arisen so far. Even though the Arms 
Trade Control Department is not the only agency with ex-
tensive technical expertise in weapons, its delegates are of 
a considerably higher rank than the officials from the other 
agencies, which sometimes hinders the discussions.16
At the same time there is a kind of power struggle  go-
ing on between the Arms Trade Control Department and the 
other agencies, because given that the department has the 
best capacity to monitor statistical information on seized il-
legal weapons, this gives it an advantage over some agen-
cies that are superior in rank but that do not have functional 
authority over the department. These two factors, coupled 
with the minor role that many of the other agencies on the 
committee play in controlling the arms trade , make the Arms 
Trade Control Department especially influential in decision-
making. This also, in turn, makes it possible for the depart-
ment to block initiatives and work proposals, even when the 
majority of other participants are in favor of these.17
Beyond defining policies, the security forces, customs 
authorities and investigative agencies are the main force for 
fighting arms trafficking. The operating units of the Military 
Forces, National Police and the Administrative Department 
of Security (DAS), as well as the Technical Investigation 
Corps (CTI) of the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Na-
tional Customs and Tax Directorate (DIAN), carry out opera-
tions to detect, seize, and investigate the weapons of the 
illegal armed groups and organized crime. 
All these agencies have been grown in strength signifi-
cantly over the past decade, in that they have been given 
both legislative authority and budgetary support that have 
provided them with new tools to fulfill their duties. Of course, 
these processes have favored some agencies more than 
others, for reasons that range from differences in institu-
tional prestige to the possibilities of receiving funds from 
international cooperation. But beyond these differences, 
the fact is that the capacity of all the institutional actors has 
grown over the past decade. 
Among these various institutions, it is worth highlight-
ing the role of the Interagency Antiterrorism Group (GIAT), 
a working group that was formally created in 1995 by Tem-
porary Directive No. 4955 of the National Defense Ministry. 
The GIAT is made up of intelligence and operations experts 
from the National Police, the National Army and the Admin-
istrative Department of Security (DAS), where its offices are 
located. The main objective of the group is to combat arms 
trafficking in Colombia, and in doing so it records weapons 
seized, collects information on arms from different State se-
curity agencies, and maintains a database of over 35,000 
weapons seized in anti-trafficking operations.18
At the same time, the GIAT is authorized to investigate, 
do analyses on modes of operation by arms traffickers, issue 
technical bulletins on trafficking to be distributed to State 
security agencies, and develop tracing procedures aimed 
at dismantling arms trafficking networks. As such, the GIAT 
is the technical and operational coordinating body with the 
most experience combating arms trafficking in Colombia, 
and some of its staff have over 15 years of experience in 
this field, which is undoubtedly a significant strength. 
Despite its long history, the GIAT suffers from three 
chronic difficulties, which to some extent reflect the structur-
al weaknesses of the Administrative Department of Security 
as a whole. First, the GIAT has a small number of agents 
that serve the group exclusively, and therefore their ability 
to handle all investigations into arms trafficking is limited.19 
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At the same time the small number of staff assigned to the 
GIAT prevents them from being present and taking charge of 
all the cases, while demand for them is high. 
Second, variability in the promotion plans for DAS de-
tectives means that the GIAT is subject to a high turnover 
rate in its staff, which means that the group’s ability to give 
continuity to its accumulated expertise is reduced. This is 
particularly costly in such a highly specialized field as the 
identification, tracing, and investigation of arms trafficking, 
because the knowledge required for these tasks is exten-
sive and built over long periods of time. In this regard, the 
announcement of the dissolution of the DAS in late 2009 
makes it necessary to establish appropriate mechanisms 
for the transfer of this information and expertise from the 
DAS to the agency (agencies) that will take over the GIAT’s 
functions. 
Third, as a civilian security agency that is noticeably 
smaller than the country’s other security forces, the DAS 
has not received the same level of political and budgetary 
support as the National Police or the Military Forces.20 Thus, 
although in recent years the department’s budget has been 
increased, the truth is that for several years developing the 
DAS’s potential for growth has been burdened by substan-
tial budget deficits, which has meant that its technical ca-
pacities have often lagged behind those of other agencies. 
It is worth mentioning the work of another agency that 
is more recent than the GIAT, the Center for Antiexplosives 
Information and Weapons Tracing (CIARA) created in 2006. 
The CIARA, under the auspices of the National Police Crimi-
nal Investigation Directorate, unites experts and resources 
from the Police with support from the Military Forces, the 
DAS, the CTI, the Military Industry, and the U.S.  Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). In this way, 
the CIARA combines the labors of identification and tracing 
of weapons, with prevention and management of incidents 
involving explosive devices. 
The main difference between the CIARA and the GIAT 
lies in the amount of international cooperation that ac-
companied its creation, in that the ATF played a decisive 
role in shaping the CIARA, whereas the GIAT was the result 
of a purely internal process. Thus, the ATF has provided a 
number of opportunities to the CIARA, such as its participa-
tion in the International Network of Bomb Data Centers, a 
technical communication platform that unites experts from 
several countries to share operational information in a more 
expeditious manner than is usually the case through the tra-
ditional channels such as the Interpol.21
In this regard, since its creation the CIARA has had a 
number of strengths and weaknesses. In terms of the for-
mer, being a division of the National Police has allowed the 
CIARA to surmount several of the GIAT’s chronic weakness-
es, in that the Police not only have much more human and 
technical resources than the DAS, and this has also made 
it possible to establish more numerous and stable interna-
tional cooperation channels than the DAS.22
This does not mean that the CIARA does not face obsta-
cles; two in particular are worth mentioning. First, although 
the National Police force has grown rapidly in recent years, 
the national government has placed many demands on its 
mission, so much so that its human and technical resources 
are insufficient. Thus, although the CIARA has half a dozen 
trained experts, the demands on them are so numerous 
that they find it difficult to complete all of their work. 
Secondly, the CIARA’s main weakness is due to the fric-
tion and institutional reserve that has marked the relation-
ship between the Military Forces and the National Police. In 
this sense, although the CIARA was conceived as a forum for 
inter-agency work which should involve all the State security 
agencies, this has not materialized due to the reluctance of 
the National Police and the Military Forces, especially the 
Army, to engage in joint work. Thus, although the CIARA’s 
design and level of technical expertise are relevant, the lack 
of sufficient Police staff and the absence of agents from 
other security agencies have hindered it in the performance 
of its functions.
Seizures and Storage
Pressure by the security forces and the process of ne-
gotiations with the illegal armed groups resulted in a long 
series of disarmament and seizures of illegal weapons. In 
this sense, as well as the 31,671 AUC fighters who demobi-
lized between 2003 and 2006, another 17,187 individuals 
demobilized between 2003 and 2008.23 This process, while 
making it possible to remove a large number of weapons 
from circulation in recent years, has required constant at-
tention from the authorities to prevent the weapons surren-
dered and seized from re-entering the black market. 
First, in terms of the surrender and seizures of small 
quantities of weapons, there have been difficulties in the 
work of systematically identifying and storing the weapons. 
This occurs because of factors already mentioned, includ-
ing the fact that the warehouses are scattered throughout 
the country, along with a lack of unified national records, 
the risk of misidentification, and substituting weapons.24 All 
of these imply opportunities for administrative errors, and 
even the unauthorized removal of weapons from storage. 
Second, in terms of the massive surrender of arms during 
the collective demobilizations, concerns have been raised 
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that not all of the weapons were handed in, and that those 
that were surrendered were in disuse. These concerns were 
raised publicly during the demobilization of the AUC, in that 
the figure of 31,671 demobilized fighters did not seem com-
mensurate with 18,051 weapons surrendered. From this 
perspective, it has been suggested that several AUC struc-
tures hid a significant part of their arsenals to be recovered 
in the future, if they either became disappointed with the 
reintegration process, or with the intention to re-organize in 
the future.25 In any case, by way of comparison, it is worth 
mentioning that the proportion of weapons surrendered by 
the AUC is greater than what was delivered in demobiliza-
tion experiences in several Central American countries. 
Third, the durability of light arms makes it possible for 
these to survive remarkably well over time, especially when 
kept in relatively acceptable storage conditions. For this 
reason, it is preferable to destroy the arsenals seized after 
they have been properly identified for legal purposes, rather 
than storing the weapons for long periods of time. In this 
sense, without disparaging the Colombian State’s commit-
ment melting down the weapons, in which 131,181 weap-
ons were destroyed between 2002 and 2008,26 the volume 
of weapons that remains in storage constitutes a constant 
risk, especially given their possible cannibalization to manu-
facture homemade weapons.
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Chapter 4
LIGHT WEAPONS SURRENDERED BY THE AUC
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As mentioned in Chapter 1 of the report, Colombia has 
a number of sources of information that represent consid-
erable potential for studying trafficking in light weapons. 
Ranging from statistics dating back to the early 1970s, to 
the collective demobilizations by the illegal armed groups, 
and the weapons surrendered by individual combatants, 
the country has at its disposal a wealth of primary and sec-
ondary information that other nations in conflict would be 
hard pressed to produce. 
Despite this potential, only tentative use has been 
made of this information, and to date no in-depth quanti-
tative study has been done on the basis of this data. The 
following pages are a first step in this direction, based on 
an analysis of nearly 10,000 weapons surrendered by the 
United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) as part of the 
demobilization process. This analysis is supplemented with 
findings derived from fieldwork and information recorded on 
hundreds of weapons that are stored in the warehouses of 
the National Police Investigations Directorate and the Met-
ropolitan Police of Bogota.1
The AUC Demobilization and the 
Selection of the Sample
The United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia demobi-
lized 31,671 combatants between 2003 and 2006, who 
turned over 18,051 weapons and weapon parts. The agen-
cies that received the weapons were the Colombian Com-
missioner for Peace, the Military Forces General Command, 
the National Police, the Administrative Department of Secu-
rity (DAS) and the Prosecutor General’s Office, accompanied 
by the Organization of American States. The surrendered 
weapons were destroyed in a smelting process at the Na-
tional Steel corporation on 13 December 2007.2
Some observers have expressed concerns about the 
process of surrendering of arms, citing two basic issues. 
First, the number of weapons handed over per person, 0.58, 
has been interpreted as an indication that the AUC did not 
surrender all of their weapons.3 This perception has been 
reinforced by the discovery in recent years of the group’s 
caches of weapons. Second, the relative newness of some 
of the weapons surrendered indicated that at least some 
groups were still making purchases on the black market, 
even during the negotiations with the government.4
Keeping these concerns in mind, the number of weap-
ons surrendered by the AUC does not seem so low when 
considered in comparative terms. As such, 0.58 weapons/
man far exceeds the number of weapons handed over in 
the demobilizations of Colombian guerrilla groups in the 
early 1990s, which yielded an average of 0.38/man.5 In re-
gional terms, this is a higher rate than seen in other Latin 
American experiences, such as the 0.50 weapons/man that 
the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit surrendered.6 
Finally, if the figures are broken down into weapons surren-
dered by each group, it may be seen that in several cases 
AUC groups surrendered 0.9 weapons/man.7 As such, the 
weapons handed over by the AUC constitute a broad and 
representative sample of the arms acquired by this illegal 
organization.
In light of this information, the project’s research team 
examined a sample of 9,883 AUC weapons, equivalent to 
54,6% of all the weapons handed over by the group. This 
sample was made up of two sets of information. On the one 
hand, all the European weapons surrendered by the AUC 
(4,883 weapons), and, on the other hand, a control group of 
4,968 weapons from the rest of the world. The sample was 
differentiated because the research team was especially 
interested in analyzing the dynamics of European arms traf-
ficking to Colombia’s illegal armed groups, as explained in 
chapter 1.
This process served to develop a database with infor-
mation on the manufacturers, types, models, countries of 
origin, serial numbers, calibers, and particular markings 
of weapons surrendered by each AUC structure. This infor-
mation was used to develop the core of the analysis that 
follows. This was done using information contained in the 
forms that officials of the Colombian security forces filled 
out during the 38 demobilizations that took place between 
3 December 2003 and 15 August 2006.8 This work was 
made possible thanks to the cooperation of the Office of the 
Vice President and the Administrative Department of Secu-
rity - DAS, whose officials provided all the support requested 
by the research team.
General Characteristics of the Weapons 
Surrendered
A preliminary review of the sample of 9,851 weapons 
surrendered by the AUC reveals the illegal group’s prefer-
ence for long arms. As shown in Figure 4.1, the main weap-
ons used by the paramilitaries were rifles (71.62%), followed 
by revolvers and pistols (15.3%). Likewise, it is worth not-
ing that weapons surrendered indicate that the AUC had 
considerable firepower, in that the weapons surrendered 
included different types of commercial grenade launchers 
(110 units), rocket launchers (24 units), and a significant 
number of handmade grenades (229).
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Figure 4.1: Weapons surrendered by the AUC.
Given these characteristics of the weapons surrendered 
by the AUC, it is quite clear that this demobilization -even if 
partial and not without its problems-, was a significant step 
forward in building peace in Colombia.
In another vein, the review of the countries of origin of 
the weapons surrendered indicates very few Colombian-
made weapons in the AUC arsenal. The firearms manufac-
tured in Colombia account for 2.48% of the sample, and it 
is estimated that these would account for about 3.5% of the 
total (Table 4.1).9 Along the same line, few weapons were 
found from the countries that supply arms to Colombia’s 
security forces, such as Israel and the United States, whose 
arms account for 18.38% of the sample and probably about 
25% of the total.
Table 4.1: Countries of origin of the weapons surrendered by the 
AUC.10
In contrast with the above, there is a considerable pres-
ence of weapons from countries that either never legally 
sold small arms to Colombia’s agencies, or that have not 
done so for several years. Among these are Bulgaria, China, 
and North Korea in the former category, and Austria, Spain, 
Italy, Germany, and Belgium, in the latter. This reinforces the 
hypothesis that most of the AUC’s weapons came from the 
black market, enabling the group to acquire weapons that 
were not available to the Colombian security forces. 
It is also useful to break down the types of weapons 
from each country. Assault rifles were the most predominant 
weapons observed in the sample: accounting for 99.7% of 
the Bulgarian weapons and 94.9% of the Russian weapons. 
In contrast, Colombian-made weapons were mostly pistols 
and revolvers (76.9%), and only 6.1% were assault rifles 
manufactured under license by Indumil. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the prevalence of rifles among the 
weapons most used by the AUC, especially the AK-47 M1A1, 
AKM, and AK-47 models. This reiterates that several of the 
most commonly found models are not used by Colombia’s 
security forces and came from countries that have never le-
gally sold arms to Colombia. Examples of these are the Ser-
bian M97 and the Bulgarian AK-47 M1A1. Also notable are 
COUNTRY SAMPLE
% 
SAMPLE +
TOTAL (E.)
% TOTAL 
(E.)
Austria 131 1,32% 131 0,73%
Serbia 145 1,46% 363 2,01%
Israel 146 1,47% 365 2,02%
Spain 157 1,58% 157 0,87%
Poland 202 2,03% 505 2,80%
Italy 237 2,38% 237 1,31%
Colombia 247 2,48% 618 3,42%
Romania 361 3,63% 361 5,00%
China 416 4,18% 1.040 5,76%
Hungary 418 4,20% 418 2,32%
Germany 587 5,90% 587 3,25%
Belgium 720 7,23% 720 3,99%
North 
Korea
725 7,28% 1.813 10,04%
Rusia 1.324 13,30% 3.310 18,34%
United 
States
1.683 16,91% 4.208 23,31%
Bulgaria 1.848 18,57% 1.848 10,24%
Others 605 6,08% 1.372 4,69%
Total 9.952 100% 18.051 100%
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the weapons made in countries that have not sold arms to 
the Colombian State for years, such as the Belgian Brown-
ing High Power (P35).
were the most commonly found models of both pistols and 
assault rifles.
European Weapons Surrendered by the AUC
Regarding exclusively weapons of European origin, 4,883 
weapons in the sample were found to have been produced in 
Europe or under manufacturing license from European coun-
tries. These account for account for 65.71% of the machine 
guns and submachine guns, 51.31% of rifles, and 44.15% of 
pistols and revolvers. Figure 4.3 illustrates the percentage of 
weapons by country of origin within this group. It is interest-
ing to note that the Bulgarian arms stand out compared with 
other countries, with a total of 1,851 specimens.13
Although a distant second from Bulgaria, Belgium ac-
counts for a total of 407 rifles, of which 97.2% are different 
variants of the FAL model. Belgium also accounts for 273 
Browning High Power pistols. Third are German weapons, 
specially those from former East Germany, and which in-
clude different models of Kalashnikov rifles, as the AKM, 
and the AK-47, and the AKM MPiKM. Several of latter ones 
seem to have been obtained from combats with FARC, as 
becomes apparent when contrasting the serial numbers of 
weapons found in the hands of the AUC with those seized 
from FARC in the Jordan case.14
Figure 4.2: Most common models of weapons surrendered by the 
AUC.
In general, while many pistols and revolvers came from 
Colombia and the United States (Llama, Colt, Smith & Wes-
son, and Ruger), the most commonly seen model is of Eu-
ropean origin, the Belgian Browning High Power. Currently, 
the standard model for this pistol (model 1935) is manu-
factured by Fabrique Nationale d’Armes de Guerre SA, Her-
stal (FN-Herstal SA) - and by the Military Factory “Fray Luis 
Beltrán” in Argentina, under license. Although the Argentine 
model is very similar to Belgian design, there are noticeable 
differences in the weapon’s dimensions. However, the Mk 
2 and Mk 3 models, the latest in the High Power line, are 
not licensed for production outside of Belgium.11 FN Herstal 
SA sells these weapons directly to its customers (countries 
or individuals). Regarding the weapons encountered in the 
sample, available information suggests that these weapons 
were purchased by Venezuelan customers, and were then 
diverted to Colombia. To support this hypothesis, according 
to the NISAT database, between 1990 and 2001, the Bel-
gian government awarded 14 licenses for the sale of small 
arms to Venezuela12.
In terms of assault rifles, 52% of the models included 
in the sample were European, followed by three other coun-
tries: North Korea (44.35%), USA (37.22%) and Russia 
(22.43%). In other words, European weapons, though not 
accounting for most of the weapons found in the sample, 
Figure 4.3: Percentage of European weapons in the sample by 
country
Germany
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croacia 
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France 
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As the chart shows, there are substantial differences 
between the countries. As such, 38.07% of the weapons 
are from Bulgaria, 14.52% from Belgium, and 12.01% from 
Germany, while the percentages of arms of Portuguese or 
Czech origin do not exceed 1%. 
However, the cases of Serbia, Yugoslavia and Switzer-
land are of particular interest for several reasons. First, Serb 
weapons (model M97) found during the project are made by 
the Zastava factory, which survived after the breakup of Yu-
goslavia, and became Serbian. Serbia is both a candidate 
for membership of the European Union and a member of 
the European Council and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.
The case of former Yugoslav weapons is interesting as 
well. Heckler and Koch MP5 sub-machine guns, began to be 
produced in Ensfield, England, being then called EN MP5. 
Through the serial numbers and bench-test markings, re-
searchers established that the weapons surrendered by the 
AUC belonged to a shipment originally sold to the Yugoslavi-
an police through England, to avoid the restrictions imposed 
by the German government on H&K. These weapons ended 
in Colombia, but it was impossible to determine the approxi-
mate date on which they arrived to the country.
Finally, although the percentage is not significant, there 
are weapons of Swiss origin. Although Switzerland is not a 
member of the European Union, it is part of the European 
Association for Free Trade. And it is at least paradoxical that 
armament of a country renowned for its official neutrality, 
with several organizations dedicated to the pursuit of peace 
based on its territory, finished in the hands of illegal groups 
in a country with a conflict like Colombia.
The European weapons selected for the sample reflect 
the same trend in terms of the above-mentioned kinds. As-
sault rifles (3,617 units) and handguns (895 units) were the 
most common weapons handed over by the AUC, as illus-
trated in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Types of European weapons surrendered by the AUC.
Comparing the type of weapon with the caliber (Figure 
4.5), it may be seen that a high percentage of the weap-
ons are models that are exclusively for military use, such 
as rifles, machine guns, submachine guns and some cali-
bers of restricted use (9mm, .223, 5.56 x45mm, 7.62mm, 
and 7.56x39mm). This reinforces the hypothesis that the 
European weapons acquired by the AUC came mainly from 
black market trafficking networks, given that the weapons 
of these types that are exported to Colombia are exclusively 
for the use of the security forces, and these forces use dif-
ferent calibers than the ones that were found.
Figure 4.5: Main calibers of the European weapons surrendered 
by the AUC.
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In terms of the manufacturers of the weapons, the dif-
ferent models of Kalashnikov (See Figure 4.2) are notable. 
First, accounting for 27.52% of the sample, is the AK-47 
M1A1. This is a Bulgarian version of the AK-47 produced by 
the Arsenal Company. As well as this model, Arsenal is the 
leading manufacturer of European weapons found among 
the weapons that the AUC surrendered during demobiliza-
tion, accounting for 36.62% of the total. The second compa-
ny most frequently seen in the sample is Fabrique Nationale 
Herstal, on account of the large numbers of Browning High 
Power pistols. This weapon appears is the only pistol among 
the most commonly found models, accounting for 4.05% of 
the total sample of European arms.15 
Moreover, there is a moderate presence in the sample 
of Hungarian arms, manufactured by two companies: Fe-
gyver És Gépgyár and state manufacturers, which account 
for 4.19% and 11.08%, respectively. These manufacturers 
concentrate their production on the AMD-65 and AKM, both 
enhanced versions of the AK-47. 
With this first glance at the selection of weapons sur-
rendered by the AUC and a closer examination of those 
from Europe, it is possible to draw some preliminary con-
clusions. First, it is clear that most of the AUC’s rifles were 
foreign-made. Most of these came from Bulgaria, shipped 
on the Otterloo, followed by other countries such as Hun-
gary, Germany, and Romania. Second, the low percentage 
of Colombian and Israel-made weapons indicates a low rate 
of channeling weapons from State forces to the AUC. Third, 
evidence of a comparatively high rate of European-made 
weapons in the hands of the AUC merits taking a deeper 
look at the possible dynamics of arms trafficking from those 
countries to Colombia. These ideas are examined in greater 
detail in the following chapter.
4 Ibid. Colombian intelligence officials interviewed for this project shared 
that opinion.
5 During the different demobilization processes with guerrilla groups, 
4,715 former combatants surrendered with 1,785 weapons between 
1990 and 1994. Program for Supplementary Care for the Reincorpo-
rated Population Present in Bogotá, “Ciudadanos excombatientes: un 
desafío de reconciliación e inclusión para Bogotá,” Bogotá City Govern-
ment, 2006, p. 5.
6 Jane’s Defense Weekly, “UN Monitors Disarmament in Guatemala”, 
Jane’s Defense Weekly,  p. 14.
7 This was the case of groups such as the Libertadores del Sur Bloc that 
demobilized 689 men and handed over 596 weapons in July 2005, and 
the Vencedores de Arauca Bloc that demobilized 468 men and surren-
dered 399 weapons in December that same year, for example.
8 Some of this information is available in digital format, and some was 
recorded by the research team, in that only hard copy records existed. 
All of the information collected and processed by the research team was 
provided to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) to be added 
to its databases, in accordance with the security agreements made be-
tween this agency and the Ideas para la Paz Foundation.
9 To estimate the total number of weapons from non-European countries 
among the weapons surrendered, the number of non-European weap-
ons found in the sample was multiplied by 2.5. Given the size of the 
sample of non-European weapons (26% of all weapons surrendered), it 
is considered that this estimate is representative.
10 In the table, “Others” includes those countries whose arms represent 
less than 1%, such as: Peru,Venezuela, Argentina, Brasil, Turkey, South 
Africa, Taiwan, Egypt, Switzerland, France, Yugoslavia, Croacia, Portugal, 
and the Czech Republic which includes Czechoslovakia, Russia includes 
the Soviet Union, and Germany includes weapons listed as being from 
East Germany.
11 As indicated by Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2009-2010, several countries 
produce similar models of the Browning High Power Standard, High Power 
Mk 2 and Mk 3. Such is the case of North China Industries Corporation 
(NORINCO), manufacturer of unauthorized copies of the Standard model, 
the Mk2 & Mk 3 models. Other countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary and 
India, produces the 9mm Arcus-94, Model 1A Auto P9 and 9mm pistol 
models, respectively, which are, ultimately, weapons very similar to the 
original model, albeit with some changes and / or improvements.
12 Although NISAT provides only aggregated information, it is likely that this 
model pistol was part of these shipments, as it is Herstal’s most popular 
export pistol. See: Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2009-2010, p. 12-13
13 Of these weapons, 1,831 were different variations of the Kalas hnikov 
AK-47 and AKM models.
14 The research team had access to a large number of Jordanian rifles 
seized from the FARC, days before being cast.
15 The government has not made any purchase of this pistol for the Co-
lombian security Forces. In the case of private persons, the only way to 
buy a gun non produced in Colombia, is through INDUMIL, by making a 
solicitation to this entity.
ENDNOTES
1 In this regard it is worth clarifying that: i) the hundred arms consisted of 
long and short range weapons, and ii) data collection of weapons was 
as complete as possible, following international standards for the iden-
tification of SALW. This includes complete information on the weapon, 
proof marks, unusual markings, and photographs of all sides and marks 
in the weapon.
2 Press Secretary - Presidency of the Republic, “Este viernes fundirán 
las 18.051 armas que entregaron las AUC,” 13 December 2007. 
Available online at: http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2007/diciem-
bre/13/08132007.html
3 Muggah, Robert “Excedentes de armas, un riesgo para la paz,” Semana.
com, 5 August 2008. Available online at: http://www.semana.com/wf_
ImprimirArticulo.aspx?IdArt=114257 
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Chapter 5
ORIGINS,  ROUTES AND DISTRIBUTION
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he notable presence of European weapons in AUC ar-
senals begs a number of questions as to how these arrived 
in Colombia. As illustrated in the previous chapter, Bulgaria 
is ranked as the main source of European weapons, ac-
counting for 38.07% of the sample, followed by Belgium 
(14.42%), Germany (12.01%), Hungary (8.55%), and Roma-
nia (7.44%).
Two hypotheses emerge to explain how these weapons 
were brought into the country. On the one hand, there is the 
possibility that these weapons were part of a few large-scale 
trafficking shipments, centrally negotiated by AUC com-
manders and latter distributed to their regional structures. 
On the other hand, the figures could represent the sum of 
multiple trafficking operations and the siphoning of small 
quantities of arms, as one would expect if each AUC unit 
were responsible for its own arms supply.
This chapter aims to shed light on these questions. It 
starts by reviewing the countries of origin, types, models, 
and calibers of weapons surrendered by each of the AUC’s 
regional structures, paying special attention to the most 
important ones. Then, by way of contrast, we study several 
clusters of weapons organized according to their countries 
of manufacture, types, models, and serial numbers, to iden-
tify which sets of weapons may have come from the same 
smuggling operations.
Distribution of European Weapons by 
Demobilized Structure
A preliminary review of European weapons surrendered 
by each AUC structure corresponds to the trends observed 
in chapter 4. In this regard, we note that all the demobilized 
blocs and fronts handed over different quantities of Euro-
pean weapons, with the fewest European weapons coming 
from the Chepe Barrera front (3) and the most coming from 
the Northern Bloc (535).
Table 5.1 Number of weapons per Block
Similar to what was observed in the previous chapter, the 
distribution of surrendered weapons among their European 
producer countries is not homogeneous. The overwhelming 
presence of Bulgarian weapons in almost all the demobi-
lized blocs is consistent with Bulgaria’s standing among the 
sample’s countries of origin. Something similar is observed 
in the case of weapons of Belgian and German origin, which 
reflects the ranking of both countries in the database.
BLOCS AND FRONTS
NO. 
SAMPLE
% SAMPLE
Chepe Barrera 3 0,06%
Autodefensas de Córdoba 8 0,16%
Mojana 12 0,25%
Pacífico 13 0,27%
Sudoeste Antioqueño 14 0,29%
Tolima 16 0,33%
Noroccidente Antioqueño 28 0,57%
Cacique Nutibara 34 0,70%
Sinú y San Jorge 53 1,09%
Vichada 57 1,17%
Autodefensas campesinas de 
Puerto Boyacá
91 1,86%
Héroes de Tolova 95 1,95%
Resistencia Tayrona 97 1,99%
Magdalena Medio 108 2,21%
Meta y Vichada 111 2,27%
Wayu 121 2,48%
Vencedores de Arauca 129 2,64%
Mineros 133 2,72%
Elmer Cardenas 136 2,79%
Catatumbo 143 2,93%
Nordeste Antioqueño 157 3,22%
Héroes de los Montes de María 168 3,44%
Héroes de los Andaquies 176 3,60%
Héroes de Valledupar 183 3,75%
Centauros 191 3,91%
Héroes de Granada 239 4,89%
Héroes del Llano 244 5,00%
Libertadores del Sur 302 6,18%
Central Bolívar 306 6,27%
No information 458 9,38%
Bananero 522 10,69%
Norte 535 10,96%
Total 4883 100%
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In considering the most important structures that de-
mobilized, in most cases there is a significant difference 
between the country of origin that accounts for most Euro-
pean weapons and the next on the list. An example of this 
is the Bananero Bloc, whose arsenal of European weapons 
is made up of 68.39% Bulgarian weapons, followed by Ger-
man (8.81%), and a combination of 11 countries account 
for the remaining 22.8%. Another example of this is the 
Central Bolivar Bloc, most of whose European weapons are 
from Bulgaria (83.01%).
Figure 5.2 illustrates the distribution of the types of Eu-
ropean weapons most commonly found in the larger blocs 
and fronts. Altogether, these types of weapons accounted 
for 86.78% of the European weapons handed over by the 
Bananero Bloc, 96.73% of the Central Bolivar Bloc, 83.44% 
of the Libertadores del Sur Bloc, and 84.84% of the Héroes 
del Llano Bloc.
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Figure 5.1: Countries of origin most often seen in the European 
weapons surrendered by the main AUC groups
The AUC’s smaller units handed over a far smaller num-
ber of European weapons, and these were more evenly 
distributed among various European countries. The first ob-
servation can be attributed to the fact that fewer weapons 
were surrendered by these blocs and fronts because of their 
size. The second issue is more interesting, because it would 
indicate that smaller groups had more difficulties standard-
izing their weapons. This trend is not without exceptions, 
however, such as the Héroes de Andaquíes and Héroes 
de Montes de Maria Blocs, whose arsenals once again re-
vealed a prevalence of Bulgarian weapons. 
Beyond their countries of origin, the heterogeneity of Eu-
ropean weapons surrendered by the AUC was also reflected 
in the types of weapons handed over by its different blocs 
and fronts. As such, there was much variety in the types 
of weapons of European origin found in the demobilization 
process. As illustrated in the previous chapter, most of these 
were assault rifles, followed by pistols.
Figure 5.2: Types of European weapons most commonly found 
among the materials surrendered by the main AUC groups 
A case that stands out is that of the Central Bolivar Bloc. 
All of the European weapons that this bloc handed over were 
rifles, machine guns, and submachine guns, as illustrated in 
Table 5.2. This presents an unusual case, if one considers 
the absence of pistols like the Belgian-made Browning High 
Power, so commonly found in other AUC structures.
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Table 5.2: Types of European weapons surrendered by the Central 
Bolivar Bloc
Considering the models of the weapons surrendered by 
the main AUC groups, specifically in terms of assault rifles, 
the prevalence of the different models of AK-47 is notable, 
in particular the Bulgarian AK-47 M1A1 and the AK-47S, fol-
lowed by the AKM MPiKM from former East Germany, and 
the Hungarian AMD-65, as shown in Figure 5.3.
BLOC TYPE COUNTRY CALIBER NUMBER
Central 
Bolívar
Rifles
Poland 7.62x54R mm 8
Romania 7.62x39 mm 1
Machine 
guns
Germany
7.62x39 mm
7.62x51 mm
9
3
Belgium 7.62x51 mm 5
Bulgary
5.56x45 mm
7.62x39 mm
244
10
Hungary 7.62x39 mm 8
Poland 7.62x39 mm 3
Romania 7.62x39 mm 14
Sub-Machine gun Germany 9 mm 1
Total 306
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the hypothesis that said organization, or at least its main 
structures, had a certain amount of bargaining power and 
the ability to centralize weapons purchases. It should be 
noted that this situation is not reflected to the same degree 
in the case of the smaller groups, who handed over much 
smaller percentages of these models of rifles. 
In any case, it is clear that while certain models of as-
sault rifles are widely represented in the sample, their ori-
gins are more varied than this classification would suggest. 
Thus, Table 5.3 illustrates how some of the most common 
models surrendered by the organization’s main blocs and 
fronts were produced in different countries. The  AKM and 
AKM MpiKM assault rifles are examples of this, as they are 
very commonly found models that were produced in five 
countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the for-
mer East Germany.
Figure 5.3: Models of European assault rifles most commonly 
surrendered by the main AUC groups
The above illustrates the prevalence of assault rifles 
from those countries in the AUC arsenal. It also strengthens 
BLOC/FRONT COUNTRY MODEL NUMBER
Norte
Hungary AMD-65 40
Serbia M97 101
Bananero
Germany AKM 20
Bulgaria
AK-47 M1A1
AKM
269
1
Hungary AKM 11
Poland AKM 4
Romania AK-47 25
Central 
Bolívar
Bulgaria AK-47 M1A1 136
Hungary AKM 14
Libertadores 
del Sur
Germany AK-47 7
Bulgaria AK-47 M1A1 136
Hungary AKM 14
Héroes del 
Llano
Germany AKM MPiKM 50
Hungary
AKM MPiKM
AMD-65
1
74
Table 5.3: Models and countries of origin of the most common 
European assault rifles surrendered by the main AUC groups
Clusters of European Weapons 
As shown in chapter 4 and reiterated in the previous 
pages, a considerable presence of European weapons was 
found in the arsenals handed over by the AUC. Equally inter-
esting is the fact that European weapons were found in all 
the demobilized fronts and blocs. Neither of these two ob-
servations, however, it is sufficient to determine the mecha-
nisms through which this illegal organization acquired its 
weapons. So as to better understand this phenomenon, 
what follows is an outline of the main findings of the cluster 
analysis mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.
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COUNTRY TYPE MODEL NUMBER
Bulgaria Rifle
Ak-47
AK-47M1
AK-47M1A1
Ak-47S
AK-47 M1A1
AKMS
32
50
270
22
44
7
Poland Rifle
AKM
AKMS
PKM
17
13
53
Romania Rifle
AKM
SAR-1
8
33
Germany Rifle
AK-47
MPiKM
32
31
Italy Gun Beretta Cougar 8000 11
Belgium Gun
Browning High Power
Browning BDA-380
37
22
Austria Rifle Steyr Aug 14
For the purposes of analysis, the 4,883 European weap-
ons in the sample were organized by country of origin, type, 
model, caliber, and serial number. Using this information, 
the research team was able to identify 17 clusters, consist-
ing of 696 weapons that might represent a small number 
of shipments or siphoning incidents. The largest set was 
made up of 270 Bulgarian AK-47 M1A1s, while the small-
est was seven AKM rifles from the same country. Table 5.4 
illustrates the make-up of the sets mentioned.
Table 5.4: Clusters of European weapons
A cursory glance at the composition of these clusters 
reflects some of the trends already found, and this reaffirms 
the high frequency of Bulgarian, Romanian, Belgian, and 
German weapons in AUC arsenals. Beyond initial appear-
ances, however, the cluster study serves not only to comple-
ment our understanding of the phenomenon, but also to 
challenge some of the existing beliefs on the AUC’s arms 
trafficking mechanisms.
In this sense, the best-documented studies on the origin 
of the AUC’s Bulgarian weapons indicate that in 1999 the 
illegal group acquired 7,640 AK-47 M1A1s, of 5.56 caliber. 
This purchase would have been made directly from the Arse-
nal factory, using a counterfeit end-user certificate and the 
cooperation of two low-ranking  Colombian Army officers.1
Given this consensus on the existence of a single ship-
ment of this model of Bulgarian rifles, it is interesting to note 
that both 5.56 caliber and 7.62 caliber weapons were found 
in the clusters. Serial numbers also vary widely, ranging 
from AE395498 in one of the clusters to ИM396639 in an-
other. This distance between the serial numbers would sug-
gest that the weapons came from different production lots, 
which in turn would suggest the possibility of more than traf-
ficking operation involving Bulgarian AK-47 M1A1s.
Something similar could be said about the Romanian 
AKM and SAR-1 rifles. In recent years Colombian intelli-
gence agencies have been investigating a Romanian arms 
trafficking operation in the country, focusing their attention 
on SAR rifles. This would be reflected in the cluster of 33 
SAR-1s found in the sample, which have almost consecutive 
serial numbers starting with SI733282003, that indicate 
that they were manufactured in 2003. 
In this sense, the discovery of a set of eight 7.56x39 cal-
iber AKMs in the clusters is interesting. This set of weapons, 
although not very numerous, includes serial numbers that 
begin with 1985PZ5229 and end with 1985RL7197. The 18 
years of difference in manufacture between the SAR-1 and 
the AKM rifles begs the questions: Did both lots arrive in 
Colombia at the same time as part of a single transaction, 
or has Romanian arms trafficking to Colombia been going 
on for much longer than had been believed?
Even more unusual is the case of the PKM machine guns 
that are identified as being Polish in the AUC demobilization 
records. This group of 54 7.62x54R caliber machine guns 
contains 54 intermittent of serial numbers, of which the old-
est is F11741998 and the most recent is F17531999.
This is interesting because, like the Romanian AKM 
case, no public attention has been paid to this possible in-
stance of international traffic from Poland. Unlike the Ro-
manian AKMs, however, the Polish PKMs are of a far more 
recent vintage, and as such one would expect to find men-
tion to them in the public record. To the best of the project 
team’s knowledge, this is not the case.
These cases indicate the great analysis potential of a 
cluster study, as is proposed here. In this sense, the idea 
would be to broach a new line of study of arms trafficking in 
Colombia, which certainly could be better done to the extent 
that more data is available.
Given this potential, we must acknowledge the interpre-
tative limitations of the exercise presented here. The 696 
weapons contained in the 17 clusters represent 13.96% of 
the sample of European weapons examined in the study. 
Thus, although interesting, this exercise does not allow us to 
make broad generalizations about the European weapons 
surrendered by the AUC. 
Without losing sight of these limitations, it is also neces-
sary to note that it is very likely that the sample of 4,883 
European weapons handed over by the AUC contains more 
clusters than have been identified in this report. This is be-
cause the AUC systematically erased serial numbers, which 
prevented the research team from fully analyzing 51.34% of 
the records in the database.
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1 Vranckx, p. 29.
Deleting serial numbers appear to have been a com-
mon practice across AUC structures, of which the Norte Bloc 
seems to have been the least diligent about deleting this 
information from their weapons (38.67%), while the Héroes 
de Andaquíes Bloc seems to have been the most effective in 
this task, removing the serial numbers from 93.81% of the 
176 weapons surrendered. 
Aside its frequency among demobilized groups, there 
do not seem to be any specific regional trends concerning 
this practice. Thus, groups located in far-flung areas such 
as the Héroes de Tolová (Córdoba), Héroes de Andaquíes 
(Caquetá), and Héroes de Montes de Maria (northern re-
gion), are among those with the highest rates of deleting 
serial numbers.
Figure 5.4: Blocs with the highest rates of serial numbers deleted 
from the weapons surrendered by the AUC
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Chapter 6
EUROPEAN ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS
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The presence of foreign arms in arsenals seized from 
AUC in Colombia is not by itself an indication that the world’s 
manufacturers of military material export as they please to 
all countries where they find clients. As states hold a legal 
monopoly on the use of violence, arms cannot be transferred 
from one country to another without authorisation from the 
states involved. Permits must be requested and obtained 
for exporting any type and quantity of arms to an identifiable 
end-user in a clearly described country. Authorities deny or 
grant such permits in referring to local laws, such as the 
1976 United States Arms Control Act that allows the sale 
of US-made arms to foreign governments in the interest of 
their self-defence, but precludes sales to groups not tied to 
governments. This export control system also provides a list 
of governments deemed ineligible for exports. 
No such list is presented to European arms exporters, 
whose arms export permit requests are considered on a 
case-by-case basis. The (shifting) profile of ineligible clients 
is drawn in reference to 8 criteria, which include the risk that 
exported arms aggravate armed tension and serious viola-
tions of human rights or infringe upon arms embargoes that 
the European Union or other organizations set against states 
embroiled in civil war. These criteria are listed in a Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports that European countries adopted 
in 1998,1 when formalizing common criteria for arms exports, 
that some such countries had already defined in their national 
‘ethical arms export laws’.2 Efforts are also made to avoid au-
thorities of one European Union member state grant a permit 
to export to a country for which another European Union state 
had previously denied an export permit for a similar product. 
In the interest of this concerted control regime, authorities of 
European states inform one another of these denials. 
Until recently, compliance with the Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports proceeded on a voluntary basis, even if some 
European Union member states copied the Code’s crite-
ria into their national law, 3 and others, such as Germany, 
were seen to respect that list quite cautiously in their export 
practices.4 By the end of 2008, however, this export control 
system became legally binding on all 27 European Union 
member states when these adopted a Common Position on 
control of exports of military technology and equipment.5 
The system thereby came to apply to very significant share 
of the world’s small arms and light weapons producing 
companies, almost half of which are based in Europe.6 At a 
count early in this millennium, Europe exported about 60% 
of this small arms production to other regions of the world, 
making it the largest documented exporter of small arms to 
the Middle East and the Americas.7 
If this European export control system appears to have 
failed in avoiding that such small arms and light weapons 
were supplied to illegal groups in Colombia, it is not for lack 
of effort. The system strongly prohibits European authori-
ties grant permits to export arms to those groups in a di-
rect line. The European system could only have permitted 
transactions with Colombia’s authorized arms importer, 
that is INDUMIL, and in the past decade and a half, Euro-
pean exporters were even denied permits for exports to 
INDUMIL.8 In the few cases where European authorities 
revealed the grounds for these denials, they referred to a 
risk they deemed high that ‘exported arms could aggravate 
armed tension and serious violations of human rights’ in 
Colombia. Thus a few hypothesis remain to be explored on 
how European arms made it to illegal groups in Colombia 
–included AUC- ‘behind the back’ of the stringent European 
arms export regime.
The arms made it to Colombia before the European 
arms exports control regime was put in place
Clearly, some of the weapons found in the hands of ille-
gal armed groups arrived in Colombia long before the strict 
European export control system was put in place. Such is 
the case of G3 assault rifles, sold by Heckler & Koch to 
the Colombian military before 1967, a very small number 
of which was found by the research team throughout the 
study.
That said, information gathered for the project points 
towards the existence of a sizeable number of weapons pro-
duced in the late nineties in countries that, even though not 
members of the European Union at the time, did not permit 
weapons sales to non-state organizations. Among these are 
various cases of arms manufactured in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania, countries that did not join the Union 
until May 2004, but whose national norms on weapons ex-
ports should have prevented their arms from reaching the 
AUC. 
Such is the case of the 7,640 AK-47 M1A1 bulgarian 
assault rifles purchased by said illegal group in 1999 from 
the Arsenal Kazanlak factory. As has been mentioned else-
where in this report, in this opportunity – maybe the best-
documented case of large-scale traffic attributed to the 
AUC-, Arsenal was presented with a fake end-user certificate 
issued under Indumil’s name, with the complicity of two low-
ranking officers from the Colombian Army.9 
Said document was used to permit the arms export 
and their shipment to the Colombian port of Buenaventura 
without a due verification of the transaction’s authentic-
ity by Bulgarian authorities. Considering the weapons and 
their ammunition were incompatible with the Colombian 
military’s standard arms, a simple verification effort would 
probably have called attention to the unusual purchase. In 
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this sense, even thought Bulgarian authorities were not sub-
ject to the European Code of Conduct’s principles and pro-
cedures in 1999, their actions in this case proved contrary 
to their national norms.
The arms were not exported to Colombia in the 
first place, but arrived there from other countries 
that managed to buy European 
Analysis of manufacturing information and control 
bench imprints encountered on many seized arms reveals 
that upon export from Europe, these arms had a different 
destination than Colombia. From that first export destina-
tion, the arms appear to have been re-exported later on. 
Such re-exports are not usually permitted. Paperwork for 
requesting an export permit from European authorities typi-
cally includes a form on which the end-user declares the 
goods will not be re-exported unless that end-user were to 
obtain an explicit authorisation to re-export. 
After grating an export permit to a certain destination, 
authorities have few means to sanction violation of the 
non-re-export declaration, other than refrain from awarding 
new permits to export similar goods to the end-user that 
was proven not to have honoured the non-export clause in 
the past. Facing the possibility of such sanction, neither the 
destination country nor the company that supplied the arms 
would have a large interest in reporting re-exports to the 
authorities of the exporting country. Any indication that re-
export took place could obstruct that importer’s supply line 
in the future. Information on re-exports could also damage 
the exporting company’s commercial interests, as that com-
pany could be denied future export permits to supply the 
same goods to the same end-user. These interests as to re-
porting re-exports, or lack thereof, explain why the authori-
ties of exporting countries are not guaranteed to be duly 
informed of re-exports, not even when arms ‘disappeared’ 
without apparent involvement of the initial importer: In the 
case of AT-4 antitank misiles that Sweden sold to Venezuela 
in the late 1980s, the loss (‘robbery’) of a significant num-
ber of these arms was only reported to have occurred in 
the mid 1990s after AT-4s were somewhat embarrassingly 
recovered from the FARC-guerrilla in Colombia.
The European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports refers 
to this problem in its list of criteria it demands authorities 
consider when granting export permits. Criterion number 7 
on that list indicates export permits must be denied for arms 
that risk to become deviated from the control of stated and 
authorized end-users, that is, when the arms risk to get re-
exported to a third country, and/or taken away from stated 
end-users (e.g. a local police force) and put at the disposal 
of others (e.g. local organized crime syndicates). European 
authorities are asked to assess the risk that exported arms 
may become deviated from the indicated end-user in some 
foreseeable future, while they are not guaranteed to have 
information on arms that were re-exported in the past. They 
may not in all cases be able to make such assessment.
Licensed production contracts obstruct the 
efficiency of the European arms export control 
system. 
Licensed production arrangements allow local compa-
nies to manufacture a specific type of arm – for instance 
the FN FAL 7,62 mm assault rifle - under a contract with 
the company that holds the production rights on that type 
of arm. In the example of the FAL rifle, production rights are 
held by the Fabrique Nacionale d’Armes de Guerre (FN) in 
Herstal, Belgium. 
Manufacturing information and control bench imprints 
on FN FAL rifles that were seized from illegal groups in Colom-
bia indicates that many of these specimens were sourced 
by the Venezuelan National Army, for whom the Compania 
Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares (CAVIM) pro-
duced FAL rifles from 1975 onwards. In Ecuador, similar FN 
material was produced until 1994, after which the country 
began producing the ‘German’ Heckler and Koch (HK) rifles. 
Both FN and HK arms made in Ecuador were later recuper-
ated from armed groups in Colombia.
And yet, European arms exports law cover export of all 
(parts of) European arms, whether these be fabricated on 
European soil or produced elsewhere in a licensed produc-
tion arrangement. In neither case is re-export to other end-
users or third countries allowed. Exports to a third country 
would damage commercial interests of the company that 
owns the arm’s production rights: The company would be 
left with a smaller export market for its own production and/
or fewer opportunities to contract licensed production deals 
with companies in other countries still. Such re-exports 
would also constitute a backdoor through which countries 
can gain access to military equipment and technology while 
in a situation that, according to European authorities’ ethi-
cal concerns, makes that access undesirable. 
Technically speaking, ‘mother companies’ can control 
the destination of arms produced elsewhere when they 
continue to source some or all components of the arms, 
which the contracted company merely assembles. In the 
case of Venezuelan production of FN FAL riffles, the produc-
tion licence implied that parts were delivered from Belgium. 
That European country could thus have denied permits to 
export such parts, if FAL rifles that CAVIM had assembled 
for the Venezuelan army were shown to be at the disposal 
of illegal groups in Colombia. Nevertheless, the first such 
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seizures from Colombian groups early in the millennium, 
did not stop Belgian authorities to continue granting the FN 
company permits to export FAL parts to Venezuela until at 
least 2003.
Some authors who commented on weak controls over 
licensed production contracts have repeatedly brought up 
a contract that the Heckler & Koch company was believed 
to have maintained with Colombia’s INDUMIL, for manufac-
turing the G3 rifle that was put at the disposal of the Co-
lombian armed forces. The German government allegedly 
terminated that contract around 1993 out of concern over 
the armed forces were making of these arms in Colombia, in 
disrespect of human rights. However, this ‘demonstration’ 
of how an ethical European arms export regime had shown 
concern over human rights violations in a particular coun-
try, does not hold up to close scrutiny. Colombia, by way of 
INDUMIL, did in fact import a large quantity of HK G3 rifles 
from Germany in the period previous to 1967, after which 
INDUMIL obtained from the German HK company machin-
ery to maintain and repair these arms, and a licence of sorts 
to execute these repairs. Licensed production of the G3 rifle 
was never contracted to a Colombian company.10 The ‘Ger-
man government would have had little to say about Heck-
ler and Koch’s contracts at that time, as that company had 
been sold in 1991 to BAE Systems plc, a British defence, 
security and aerospace company. Colombia’s arrangement 
with HK was effectively terminated by 199311, but by deci-
sion of the Colombian government to replace most of the 
G3 arms by Galil rifles that INDUMIL began manufacturing 
in Colombia under a licensed production contract with the 
Israeli Military Industry (IMI)12. As said elsewhere in this re-
port, few of the Galil rifles that INDUMIL produced for the 
Colombian armed forces were seized from illegal armed 
groups in Colombia.
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As was mentioned early on in the report, small arms 
traffic in Colombia is a costly and long-standing problem, 
yet very few studies have addressed the subject. As a result, 
bias, misunderstandings and lacks of information abound. 
This report hopes to contribute to a better understanding 
of the problem, recognizing the obvious limitations involved 
in tackling such a complex issue in such a short document. 
With this in mind, the project’s key findings are synthesized 
in the following pages.
Conclusions
There is no doubt as to the lethality associated with 
small arms in Colombia: 3 out of 4 violent deaths in the 
country are the result of small arms use, and this share has 
remained stable even despite the sharp drop in homicide 
rates observed in recent years. Small arms also play a key 
role in deaths directly associated with the armed conflict, 
given illegal armed groups’ broad use of small arms.
In this context, the Colombian State has developed a 
comparatively strict information and control system to over-
see the production, purchase and use of legal small arms. 
These are estimated at nearly 1.3 million nationwide, and 
include those of the security forces as well as those in the 
hands of private citizens with special permits to keep and 
bear arms. Despite their relatively large number, legal arms 
are estimated to account for a very small share of arms-
related deaths.
By comparison, the Colombian State’s ability to tackle 
the illegal arms market is far more limited. This is a cause of 
concern, as the illegal arms market is not only estimated to 
be 3 or 4 times larger than the legal market, but it is also the 
source of most arms-related violence. To be sure, in recent 
years the Colombian Government has made considerable 
efforts to confront this issue, but these are still a long way 
from resolving such a complex problem.
In light of the particular importance of international 
traffic in supplying the illegal arms black market, a better 
understanding of its dynamics is a key ingredient for bet-
ter-informed policy decisions. With this in mind, this report 
sought to gather whatever little published information exists 
on small-arms trafficking in Colombia, adding to this body of 
knowledge a novel analysis based on the review of 9,851 
of the 18,051 small arms surrendered by the AUC between 
2003 and 2006, as part of the group’s demobilization pro-
cess.
While recognizing its limitations, the project’s research 
team believes the type of analysis proposed herein may 
prove useful for future studies on the dynamics of arms traf-
ficking, in Colombia and elsewhere. With regard to Colom-
bia, an interesting next step would be to analyze a larger 
sample of data, possibly drawing on the approximately 
500,000 arms seized by the authorities between 2000 and 
2008. At any rate, a number of interesting conclusions can 
be drawn from this study, even if subject to future revisions 
based on new evidence.
First, based on weapons surrendered by the AUC, it 
seems clear that Colombian law and the country’s fulfill-
ment of its international commitments have resulted in a 
robust legal framework that has kept illegal armed groups 
from procuring significant quantities of small arms in the le-
gal market. Combined with Indumil’s stringent record-keep-
ing and marking procedures, said framework has forced 
said groups to turn to the black market to satisfy their small 
arms needs.
Second, despite Colombia’s comparatively well-devel-
oped institutional capacity to combat small arms trafficking, 
the agencies tasked with said mission face various limita-
tions that hinder their effectiveness. This is particularly ap-
parent with regard to the small number of public officials 
dedicated to said mission, the meager budgetary support 
they receive from their agencies and the precarious tech-
nical cooperation they receive from the international com-
munity.
Third, weapons handed over by the AUC raise questions 
regarding the comprehensiveness of the group’s disarma-
ment, but they do not take away from the significance of the 
demobilization process, by means of which 31,671 men and 
18,051 arms were subtracted from the conflict. The weap-
ons’ destruction, under UN and OAS oversight, constitutes a 
significant step forward for peace in Colombia.
Fourth, the volume of foreign-made assault rifles and pis-
tols among the weapons handed over by the AUC questions 
conventional wisdom regarding the Colombian military’s al-
leged systematic logistical support to said group. Said hypoth-
esis merits further revision if one takes into account the fact 
that most of the AUC’s arms can be traced to countries that 
have never sold small arms to the Colombian government or, 
alternatively, have not done so for many years.
Fifth, a surprisingly high share of European-made and 
European-licensed arms was found among the weapons 
surrendered by the AUC, including 3.617 assault rifles and 
895 pistols produced in countries such a Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Belgium and Germany. Given the European Union’s strict 
export controls under its Code of Conduct, it is interesting 
that 27% of the illegal armed group’s arms were produced 
by European manufacturers.
Sixth, beyond their large share in the AUC’s overall arse-
nals, the fact that European arms were handed over by all 
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of the demobilized structures is noteworthy, even if some 
fronts appear to have had a much larger numbers of said 
weapons than others. The most significant case is the no-
torious Northern Bloc, which surrendered 535 European-
made arms, while each of the other 31 structures handed 
in an average of 152 such arms.
Finally, a review of the serial numbers extracted from the 
4,883 european arms surrendered by the AUC allowed proj-
ect researchers to compile 17 clusters that may be attributed 
to a similar number of significant traffic operations. If this 
proves to be the case, it would indicate that small arms traf-
ficking from Europe to Colombia is a far more systematic and 
diversified practice than has been accepted until now. In light 
of this, Europe’s arms export control system, though strict, 
has proved unable to block arms trafficking to Colombia.
Recommendations
Considering the findings outlined in this report, the 
project’s research team considers a number of policy rec-
ommendations are in order, aimed both at the Colombian 
Government and at the broader International Community, 
particularly the European Union.
Recommendations for the Colombian Government
• Continue policy-formulation efforts and support for 
international initiatives that have earned Colombia in-
ternational recognition. To this end, the TIA Committee 
must be strenghtened through the active participation 
of top government officials, so as to expedite decision-
making. 
• Strenghten existing capacities for investigating and 
prosecuting arms trafficking cases, through increased 
budgetary and personnel support. Special attention 
must be paid to the adequate transfer of information 
and expertise from GIAT to whichever agencies absorb 
its functions.
• Put in place a national information system for illegal 
weapons seized by the various agencies that carry out 
anti-arms trafficking operations. Said system is already 
contemplated in the TIA Committee’s 2009 Action Plan, 
but its implementation must not be allowed to slow 
down, and it must permit direct access from pertinent 
investigative authorities. 
Recommendations for the European Union and the 
International Community
• Strengthen controls to avoid arms export operations 
based on counterfeit documents. To this end, the 
Union’s Code of Conduct and Common Position can be 
ammended to include more robust procedures aimed at 
verifying the authenticity of purchase requests initiated 
by states outside the Union.
• Strengthen follow-up mechanisms for weapons sold to 
countries suspected of diverting them to colombian ille-
gal armed groups. This should serve to elevate the costs 
of diversion for countries that have previously violated 
their commitments to refrain from re-exporting arms.
• Provide Colombian authorities with timely support for 
ongoing investigations, by means of Interpol and other 
cooperation mechanisms. Given the nature of the arms-
trafficking phenomenon, opportune colaboration is es-
sential to the investigations’ prospects for success.
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